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I. DISCOVERY FOR THE DEFENSE
No innovation in civil procedure since the development of the ad-
versary system has so dramatically improved the way in which we try
our lawsuits and effect voluntary settlement as has discovery. Its basic
aims are equally appropriate for criminal cases. Such aims are to enable
each side in a suit to obtain relevant information from the other about
the issues in dispute; to safeguard against surprise at trial; to define the
issues narrowly and clearly so the parties can focus the evidence on
them; to assist in ascertaining truth and detecting perjury; to encourage
settlements by educating the parties in advance on the courtroom
chances of their claims and defenses; and to assure the availability of
probative evidence to the party whom it helps.
Nevertheless, the benefits of discovery to the parties and to the
adjudicative process result from one of the few judicial procedures gen-
erally available to a civil litigant that is not also generally available
to a criminal defendant. Despite the success that discovery has had in
reforming the civil trial process, discovery in criminal cases is still re-
sisted on the basis of objections claimed to be unique to the criminal
process. Those objections are that the mutuality of civil discovery2
would not be available in the criminal court because the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination bars discovery from the defen-
dant; that supplying criminal defendants with advance information
about the evidence against them would enable them to prepare their own
perjury, to suborn the perjury of others, or otherwise to fabricate evi-
dence in order to shape a defense to the contours of the prosecution's
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. This article was
prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center.
'See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court,
56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961); W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968).
2See Hickman v. Taylor, 392 U.S. 495, 507 n.8 (1947).
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disclosed evidence; and that defendants would intimidate prosecution
witnesses into testifying falsely or into making themselves unavailable.'
The objections are asserted to justify fears that criminal defense discov-
ery would destroy the adversary system in criminal law and give an
unfair advantage to a person charged with a crime even though he is
already well stocked with procedural protections against an unfair con-
viction. Nevertheless, the modern trend has been toward broadening
defense discovery in criminal cases since, to the extent that legitimate
policies underlie these objections, it has been found that they are not
threatened or may be protected by special procedures.
In every way in which a trend in the development of a new legal
procedure can manifest itself, it has done so in connection with discov-
ery in favor of a criminal defendant. The literature overwhelmingly
supports broad discovery. 4 Supreme Court Justice Brennan,5 Retired
Chief Justice Traynor of California," the American Bar Association,7
the American Law Institute,8 Professors Wigmore9 Goldstein,"0 Loui-
sell," Pye, 12 and Everett, 3 and many others have forcefully argued in
3See. e.g., Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1105
(1969); United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v,
Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 209-14, 227, 98 A.2d 881, 884-
86, 894 (1953); Flannery, Prosecutor's Position, 33 F.R.D. 74, 79, 80 (1963).
'Contra, Flannery, supra note 3, at 74; Grady, Discovery in Criminal Cases, Discovery Prac-
tice in Illinois (III), 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 827; Panel on Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases,
National District Attorney's Association, New York City, August 21, 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV.
320 (1965).
'Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? 1963 WASH. U.L.Q.
279 [hereinafter cited as Brennan]; Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 56 (1963); State
v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 227-35, 98 A.2d 881, 894-98 (1953) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Traynor]; Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Disocvery in
England, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 749 (1964); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 585-86, 305 P.2d 1, 13
(1956) (Traynor, J.).
7ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., THE PROBLEM OF DISCOVERY IN
CRIMINAL CASES (1961) [hereinafter cited as ALI-ABA JOINT COmm.]; ABA ADVISORY COMM.
ON PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL (Tent. Draft, May 1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA ADVISORY COMM.].
8ALI-ABA JOINT COMM.
'6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1850-1855a (3d ed. 1940).
1°Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
"Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1961);
Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REV.
921 (1961).
12Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Pye]; Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: A nother View,
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favor of defense discovery. Led by the Califonia Supreme Court, 4
several states and the federal government have by judicial decision,
statute, or rule enlarged the discovery machinery for the defendant in
their jurisdictions. i5 In nearly all of the states and in the federal system,
however, the criminal defendant remains weaker in his pretrial access
to facts in the possession of his adversary than any civil litigant. The
thesis of part I of this article is that constitutional protections are
needed, are appropriate, and are developing to extend the benefits of
broad discovery in criminal cases throughout the country.
The Prosecution's Investigative Discovery
The prosecutor, for his part, is well equipped with information-
gathering devices that include informal investigation by police, formal
procedures before trial for compelling evidence from witnesses, and even
discovery directly from the accused himself.'" For much of his informa-
tion the prosecutor needs to rely upon resources wholly apart from the
defendant. Ordinarily he must learn of the occurrence of an offense and
of its connection with a particular suspect before he is in a position to
command the cooperation of the accused. However, before his investi-
gation has focused on any particular suspect he might on the basis of
routine or of a particularized suspicion search out that suspect for infor-
mation in one form or another. The effectiveness of the informal investi-
gation by the prosecution results chiefly from three factors. First, at
least in crimes reported by a victim or witness or in which an undercover
operative is serving for the government, the police may be on the scene
promptly to begin gathering evidence. Consequently, they have the op-
portunity to obtain for use in the prosecution whatever physical or
testimonial evidence is immediately available and then to pursue their
1970 DUKE L.J. 919, 941.
"
3See Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE L.J. 477.
"See text accompanying notes 69-75 infra.
"E.g., People v. Crawford, 114 Ill. App. 2d 230, 252 N.E.2d 482 (1969); State v. Superior
Court, 106 N.H. 228, 208 A.2d 832 (1965); State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319
(1959); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3212 to -3213 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1803
(1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-155.4 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2441 (Supp. 1971);
TEX. CODE CRINI. PROC. ART. 39.14 (1966); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 195; COLO.
R. CRINI. P. 16; DEL. SUPER. CT. (CRIM.) R. 16; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220; Ky. R. CRIM. P. 5.16(2),
7.24; MD. R.P. 728.
'"See Louisell, 49 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 11, at 61; cf United States v. Garsson, 291 F.
646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L. Hand, J.). See generally Goldstein.
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investigation until they have sufficiently built up a case against a partic-
ular individual to bring charges. Secondly, trained and experienced per-
sonnel, laboratory and technical facilities, accumulated intelligence, and
cooperation from other law enforcement agencies provide the prosecu-
tion with the resources adequately to exploit its opportunities for investi-
gation. Thirdly, the civic duty and general inclination of citizens to
cooperate with police authority in the conduct of an investigation per-
mits the prosecution to secure the assistance of most witnesses who do
not fear the implication of themselves, their family, or their friends and
even the aid of many of those who do.
Principal among the formal pretrial procedures that enable the
prosecution to compel testimony -and production of documentary or
other physical evidence is the grand jury procedure. Although designed
to provide a buffer between an accused and the government that seeks
to prosecute him, the grand jury in practice i5 most often employed as
an investigative resource by law enforcement. 7 At least while it is in
session, the grand jury proceeding is conducted in secret-attended only
by the grand jurors, the prosecuting attorney, and whatever witness is
testifying at the time.' 8 No judge presides and no witness, even if he is
the suspect under investigation, may be accompanied by counsel before
the grand jury.' The importance of the grand jury procedure as an
investigative device stems from its power of compulsory judicial process,
which can, on threat of punishment for contempt," compel the atten-
dance of a witness to give testimony or to produce unprivileged2' docu-
mentary or other physical evidence so long as it is relevant to the grand
"
7Goldstein 1191; Traynor 231.
"E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d), (e).
11id.; Steele, Right to Counsel at the Grand Jury Stage of Criminal Proceedings, 36 Mo. L.
REV. 193, 194 (1971).
"Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913).2 1Corporations and other collective groups and their representatives may not claim the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination for the books and records of the organization.
United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 n.9 (1970); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 196, 205 (1946); Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 155 (1923); Wheeler v.
United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1912); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The privilege does not apply to public records or to records required
to be kept for regulatory purposes. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971); Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); see United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927). A claim of
the privilege may be defeated by a grant of immunity. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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jury's inquiry.22 This power to issue subpoenas ad testificandum and
duces tecum may be and generally is exercised by the prosecutor and
not by the independent citizens sitting as jurors. The prosecution may
even arrest and detain in custody a material witness where such is
reasonably necessary to secure his appearance before a grand jury.13
The usefulness of the grand jury procedure is considerably augmented
by the facts that no foundation in the form of a quantum of accusatory
evidence need be established to call it into service; that no judicial review
is made of the prerogatives of the prosecutor except upon challenge by
a particular witness, which is limited to a claim of personal privilege or
of the irrelevancy of a particular question; and that its investigative
character operates only on behalf of the prosecutor: it is unilateral and
non-adversary. In essence, the grand jury provides the prosecutor an ex
parte deposition procedure.
Other formal pretrial procedures for accomplishing the same pur-
pose are less useful because they are either public or adversary. These
include the coroner's inquest in homicide cases, the conventional prelim-
inary hearing, and in some jurisdictions a statutory procedure by which
the prosecuting authority is given subpoena power to depose witnesses
(who may be represented by counsel) in its offices. 24
Finally, the prosecution may "discover" evidence from the accused
himself in advance of trial. After conforming to appropriate constitu-
tional standards, the prosecution may search the person or property of
the accused and seize oral, documentary, or other physical evidence to
use in its prosecution against him.2 1 Under appropriate constitutional
safeguards and with the consent of the accused, the prosecution may
interrogate him before a grand jury or in the police station.26 The
prosecution may gather evidence from within the private enclave of the
defendant by electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping 7 or by insinuat-
"Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (19,16); Brown v. United
States, 276 U.S. 134, 143 (1928); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1923);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 77 (1906).
"Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 939,
942-44 (9th Cir. 1971).
2 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11189 (West 1966); Pye 84. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
81, 86 (1970).
2E.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); 18
U.S.C. §§ 2516-18 (1970).
"Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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ing an undercover agent into his confidence." The accused may be
compelled to exhibit his body, assume poses, and put on or take off
clothes for identification in a fairly conducted lineup;29 to provide exem-
plars of his handwriting for identification; 0 to provide fingerprints for
identification;3' and to speak for voice identification.32 The prosecu-
tion may obtain samples of his blood, breath, or urine for scientific
analysis. 33 Moreover, the defendant may be compelled in advance of
trial in at least some circumstances to specify any affirmative defenses,
such as alibi and possibly insanity or impotency, upon which he intends
to rely and to provide the prosecution with a list of the witnesses and
other evidence that he intends to produce to establish such defenses. "4
The Arguments Against Defense Discovery
Consideration of these investigative discovery tools available to the
prosecution substantially rebuts the factual assumption in the argument
that criminal discovery could be only a one-way street because the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination bars all prosecution dis-
covery from the defendant. In fact, such consideration turns the argu-
ment upon itself. As long as the defendant is not given access to substan-
tial discovery devices, discovery is a one-way street running in favor of
the prosecution with the defendant relegated for the accumulation of the
information necessary to his defense to a haphazard investigation, which
in most cases he is unable properly to finance and which is without
formal sanction or judicial assistance. The realistic effect of the denial
of discovery is to permit the prosecution "to monopolize the sources of
evidence applicable to the case to use or not as might be deemed most
advantageous" to it.35
2United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Unlike eavesdropping and wiretapping, the use of an informer need not even be approved by an
independent magistrate.
"
9United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221, 223 (1967); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245
(1910).
3'Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
3tDavis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223 (1967).
2United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223 (1967).
11d. at 222; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
"'Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d
919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962); ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 423 (1959); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016 (West
1970); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1803(d) (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.76.020 (1961);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 957.11 (1958); see discussion in Part II infra.
"State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453, 459, 80 A. 12, 15 (1911). See also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66, 100-01 (1966) (Fortas, J., concurring).
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The failure of the factual foundation for this argument is drama-
tized in cases in which the denial of defense discovery is juxtaposed with
considerable discovery for the prosecution. Such is the case when a
defendant is denied discovery of evidence that belongs to him, such as
his own statement" or evidence taken from his home or person by the
prosecution pursuant to a search and seizure.3 1
That is not the only answer to the argument. Even tested on its own
terms it does not justify denial of defense discovery. This can best be
understood in light of the objective of criminal defense discovery.
The basic purpose of such discovery is to protect the integrity of
the fact-finding process in the criminal trial.3 1 Its objective is to pro-
mote the efficiency of the judicial search for truth by giving the defen-
dant access to the evidence that the prosecution intends to use against
him, so that he might properly prepare for trial with that evidence in
mind, and to evidence that he might use on his own behalf, thus
strengthening the defendant in the performance of his adversary respon-
sibility of presenting to the trier of fact all of the relevant, unprivileged,
and favorable evidence available. "To deny flatly any right of produc-
tion on the ground that an imbalance would be created between the
advantages of prosecution and defense would be to lose sight of the true
purpose of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of the facts. ' 3 Confident
that he knows the length and breadth of the case against him, the
defendant, usually with the advice of counsel, is also in a position intelli-
gently to decide whether plea bargaining is in his best interest. 0 To the
extent that defense discovery enables the innocent defendant to be better
prepared to meet the issues and assists the guilty defendant in deciding
whether to enter a guilty plea, it serves not only the defendant but also
the criminal justice system.
Except in pursuit of abstract symmetry, the discovery that a defen-
dant can get is not logically related to what the prosecution gets. To
deny defense discovery because of limitations that the privilege against
self-incrimination might impose on prosecution discovery is to trans-
uASee State v. District Court, 135 Mont. 545, 342 P.2d 1071 (1959).
3'See State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 227, 98 A.2d 881, 896 (1953) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3"[T]he day has long since passed when a case is to be tried from ambush." Kaufman,
Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in the Federal Courts, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1957).
3 People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
"'Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 105-06 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Brennan 279;
Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 318-19 (1960); see
text accompanying note 160 infra.
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form a constitutional protection so important that conditions cannot be
imposed on its exercise41 into an excuse for a diminution of the defen-
dant's chances to get evidence to clear himself.
The undeniably salutary objective of discovery is, nevertheless, re-
sisted by the argument that the information provided will be misused
for the purpose of enabling the defendant to prepare perjured testimony
or to intimidate potential prosecution witnesses. Wigmore has rendered
the most cogent argument against this concern: "The possibility that a
dishonest accused will misuse such an opportunity is no reason for
committing the injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of
clearing himself. That argument is outworn; it was the basis (and with
equal logic) for the one-time refusal of the criminal law to allow the
accused to produce any witnesses at all." '42
This "misuse" objection was also raised against civil discovery
before it became accepted practice. 3 Justice Brennan referred to it as
"[t]hat old hobgoblin perjury."" When applied to criminal discovery,
the objection is invoked indiscriminately to bar discovery of all prosecu-
torial information without regard to its susceptibility to tampering or
to contrived rebuttal. Nonetheless, much evidence by its nature is safe
from falsification or perjured contradiction and would be useful to the
defendant only because it might support his defense or because know-
ledge of it might facilitate his demonstration of its innocent or irrelevant
character.15 This is true of the names and addresses of most potential
witnesses whom the prosecution has interviewed and decided not to call;
of medical, psychiatric, or hospital records relating to such things as
autopsies, post-mortem examinations, examinations of alleged rape vic-
tims, and examinations of blood samples; of expert reports such as
ballistics reports and results of handwriting, fingerprint, or voice
comparisons; of still or motion pictures of persons, places, objects, or
events; of tape recordings; of physical evidence that is under the supervi-
sion of a custodial officer, including medical specimens, the physical
subjects of scientific tests such as handwriting exemplars, and physical
objects or writings allegedly used in the commission of the crime such
as forged documents, weapons, ammunition, or clothing; of contraband
4
'Spevack i. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
426 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 1863, at 488. See also United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D.
550, 555-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
'
2 Brennan 290; Fletcher, supra note 40, at 308.
"'State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 227, 98 A.2d 881, 894 (1953) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"United States v. Rich, 6 Alas. 670, 670-71 (D. Alas. Terr. 1922).
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or stolen goods; of information about prior felony convictions or of
charges pending against or promises of leniency to prosecution wit-
nesses, whether identified or not; and of background information on the
members of a prospective jury panel that the prosecutor is using to assist
him in the exercise of his peremptory challenges. 6
The argument against defense discovery also fails to take account
of the circumstances in particular cases. The range of conduct pro-
scribed by the criminal law is so wide that in most situations the danger
of violent repercussions against witnesses does not present a significant
objection to disclosure of their identity. The spectre of the organized
criminal syndicate or the sadistic, mutual-defense motorcycle gang or
the vicious defendant with friends on the outside anxious to take revenge
on any proseution witness haunts efforts to provide discovery in criminal
cases beyond its realistic incidence, and a protective order may take care
of it when in fact it is manifested.4 7 Most defendants today are poor,
and many are in custody from arrest to trial.48 The danger of perjury is
more real, but to allow that danger to control discovery practices "vir-
tually postulates universal guilt [and] also impugns the demonstrated
capacity of the judicial process to ferret the truth." 9 "[A]lthough there
is a possibility that a defendant may be acting in bad faith and may be
seeking merely to acquire advance knowledge of the details of the prose-
cution's case with a view to shaping his defense accordingly, such a
possibility is subordinate in importance to the danger of convicting the
innocent . . 50
These observations are supported by the experience of the courts
that permit discovery5 and by the common informal practice of prose-
cutors selectively to supply some defense attorneys in some cases with
certain information useful to them in the representation of their clients.
"
0See Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Costello, 255
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1958).
Special needs in certain cases may provide other examples. In a case in which the regularity
of administrative processes is an issue, for instance, discovery of relevant internal agency docu-
ments may not involve any risk of misuse. See United States v. Leichtfuss, 331 F. Supp. 723, 738-
48 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
"ABA ADvIsoRY ComNt. 2-3, 37. See discussionof protective orders in text accompanying
notes 64-65 infra.
IPye 86, 91.
"State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 139, 145 A.2d 313, 316 (1958). See also United States v.
Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550, 555-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407, 408-09 (1959).
"See Langrock, Vermont's Experience in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732 (1967).
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Generally, the prosecutor will open his file to the defense attorney when
he anticipates that the strength of his case will persuade the defendant
to plead guilty.52 The arguments above are also supported by experi-
ments in the federal courts in the Southern District of California and
the District of Kansas with an Omnibus Hearing procedure designed in
part to enlarge discovery.53 Moreover, in all jurisdictions there has been
considerable de facto discovery in those cases that are retried after
mistrials or appellate reversals. Random though the designation of
those cases is, no reports have been made of the suggested dangers
resulting from the fact of discovery in them, although complaints of
prejudice from loss of evidence during the lapse of time have been rife.
The presumption of innocence has a special significance in the area
of discovery.54 Its primary function is to put the prosecution to its
burden of proof, and in that respect it is enforced by the constitutional
requirement that a criminal defendant not be convicted except by proof
that establishes his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.55 Beyond that stan-
dard, however, it speaks to procedural regularity in the judicial process-
ing of a man before he is convicted of crime. 6 More a procedural than
a factual presumption, it should require that in deciding whether to
provide defendants the evidentiary means with which to defend them-
selves, we cannot assume that all defendants are guilty or that all defen-
dants and their attorneys are prone to misuse information supplied to
them. In many if not most cases an innocent defendant has a more acute
need for discovery than a guilty defendant, who is not likely to need the
5'People v. Crawford, 114 I11. App. 2d 230,232, 252 N.E.2d 483, 484 (1969); State v. Johnson,
28 N.J. 133, 140, 145 A.2d 313, 317 (1958); People v. Preston, 13 Misc. 2d 802,_., 176 N.Y.S.2d
542, 548 (Kings County Ct. 1958); ABA ADVISORY COMM. 31, 37; Brennan 282; Flannery, supra
note 3, at 77; ALI-ABA JOINT COmm. 4-6; Panel on Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, supra
note 4, at 329; K. Pye, A Look at North Carolina's Criminal Discovery System, Prepared for the
North Carolina Governor's Committee on Law and Order 2-7, November 1970 (unpublished paper
in University of North Carolina Institute of Government Library); Traynor 237.
-See Miller, The Omnibus Hearing-An Experiment in Federal Criminal Discovery, 5 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 293 (1968). The Omnibus Hearing procedure was recommended in ABA ADVISORY
COMm. 20-21.
5 State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 964, 22 So. 2d 273, 285 (1945); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203,
234, 98 A.2d 881, 897 (1953) (Brennan, J., dissenting); People v. Quarles, 44 Misc. 2d 955, 255
N.Y.S.2d 599, 606 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Brennan 287; Goldstein 1193; Hall, Objectives of Federal
Criminal Procedure Revision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 730 (1942); Pye 82-83; Thode, Criminal Discov-
ery: Constitutional Minimums and Statutory Grants in Texas, 1 TEx. TECH L. REV. 183, 188
(1970).
"5In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
11H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 161, 167 (1968).
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prosecution's help to find out about the evidence against him with which
he might be inclined to tamper. If he is guilty he probably knows the
identity of the witnesses who might testify against him.5 7 A protective
order should be available to the prosecution when the danger of abuse
of discovery is sufficiently demonstrated.
Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept con-
fidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has
no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw
light on issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest in convict-
ing on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously
cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence per-
mits.,,
Courts and law enforcement officers outside of jurisdictions with
liberal discovery have not confined their objections in accordance with
these distinctions. For example, in Roviaro v. United States59 the Gov-
ernment refused to disclose before or at trial the name or address of an
informer who allegedly participated in the transaction charged, even
though it appeared clear that if the defendant was guilty he already
possessed that information since he had been riding in the informer's
car and several times had telephoned the informer at his home. Justice
Clark, in dissent, argued that this fact rendered harmelss the prosecu-
tion's refusal to disclose the informer's identity. In making that argu-
ment, however, he ignored the possibility of the defendant's innocence.
Notwithstanding the absence of a legitimate governmental interest in
concealing the identity of this informer from the defendant, whether the
defendant was guilty or innocent, the Government fought all the way
to the United States Supreme Court to avoid disclosure and was upheld
in its efforts by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that it was
error to deny disclosure not only at trial but before trial as well.
Similarly, in United States v. Rose0 the prosecution unsuccessfully
resisted an effort by the defendant, who was charged with perjury before
a grand jury, to secure the transcript of his own full grand jury testi-
mony in the course of which the perjury had allegedly been committed. 1
"Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 221,
240-41 (1957); Pye 91.
58People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 585, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
59353 U.S. 53 (1957).
-215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954).
"Ild. The court granted the discovery. Rule 16(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure now grants a defendant a.right to discovery of his own testimony before a grand jury.
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In United States v. Leichtfuss,2 a prosecution for violation of the Selec-
tive Service law, the United States Attorney opposed a request for the
names and addresses of potential government witnesses, although it
acknowledged that the witnesses would be a selective service employee
and an FBI agent. In granting the request for discovery, the court
observed: "Certainly there is no apparent threat that disclosure of the
identity of these witnesses prior to trial will subject the witness to physi-
cal or economic harm or to threats designed to make him unavailable
to testify or to influence him to change his testimony.""3
Whenever a court finds upon information elicited at an adversary
hearing that there is probable cause to believe that a defendant should
not be trusted with such evidence because of the danger of intimidation,
bribery, or harrassment of witnesses, 4 the court may be permitted by
issuing a protective order to make an exception from the general princi-
ple of discovery for that defendant with regard to such evidence only.
This would be a much wiser course than to deny all discovery because
of the potential for abuse in some cases. The protective order could
circumscribe the conditions of discovery by such a defendant-such as
by limiting discovery to the defense attorney and forbidding him to
make disclosure to his client until necessary to decide upon a course of
action;"5 by deferring discovery until the trial date is so imminent that
the defendant would not have time to engage in foul play; by permitting
and then supervising the blocking out of identifying information from
a witness' statement before it is delivered to defendant; or by providing
a deposition with the witness without disclosure of his identity as an
alternative to disclosing his name and address-or could completely
12331 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. III. 1971).
"Id. at 733.
"The specificity required should be analogous to that needed in an application for a search
warrant. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S.
410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480
(1958). In People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963), the trial court
followed such a procedure. In opposing a defense request for the names of witnesses, the prosecu-
tion filed an affidavit in conclusory form that defendant might, by himself or through other persons,
coerce, intimidate, or threaten the witnesses. The trial court rejected this affidavit, and the prosecu-
tor called a police officer to testify that the two witnesses had told him that they were in fear on
the basis of their knowledge of defendant's past conduct. The prosecutor also called defendant's
former probation officer to testify that defendant had assaulted another inmate and was considered
desperate and a leader of disorder. The trial court postponed discovery until twenty-four hours
before trial.
61n many cases this compromise may not be feasible because the defense attorney might need
the help of his client to take advantage of the discovery.
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deny discovery of the vulnerable evidence only if no less drastic alterna-
tive were feasible.
The Constitutional Provisions for Defense Discovery
At common law a defendant had no right of discovery." In most
states criminal discovery is still provided grudgingly at best, and in
many states it amounts to little or nothing more than the constitutional
minimum already established .6  The policy against discovery was first
modified in this country with regard to documents that the prosecution
intended to put into evidence.6 8 California was the first state to begin to
develop a system of broad discovery. In that state now, the courts have
ordered the prosecutor to provide a defendant with such things as copies
of his recorded or written statements to the police; 69 the names and
addresses of witnesses and the statements given to police by those wit-
nesses who are expected to testify at trial;70 reports of scientific analyses
of evidence,7' including records and reports of autopsies; 2 medical speci-
mens for examination by independent experts;73 and photographs of the
defendant.74 In addition, California provides every felony defendant
upon arraignment at no expense to himself a copy of the transcript of
the grand jury proceeding or the preliminary hearing in his case. 75
Many other states have followed suit by judicial decision, statute,
or rule.76 A handful of states have even gone further and provided a
"Rex v. Holland, 4 Term Rep. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
67E.g., Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730,-., 182 S.E.2d 779, 786 (1971); Lander v. State, 238 Ind.
680, 686-88, 154 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (1958); Commonwealth v. Therrien, - Mass.....,
269 N.E.2d 687, 692 (1971); State v. Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51, 63-65, 171 N.W.2d 695, 703-04
(1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1049 (1970); State v. Nussbaum, - Ore...., , 491 P.2d
1013, 1018 (1971). In Louisiana, the defendant gets no discovery except of his own written state-
ment. State v. Mitchell, 258 La. 427, -, 246 So. 2d 814, 818-23, cert. denied, 92 S. Ct.
561 (1971).
"See People ex reL Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24,28-35, 156 N.E. 84, 85-87 (1927).
"Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92, 93, 330 P.2d 773, 774 (1958); Powell v. Superior
Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 705, 707, 312 P.2d 698, 699 (1957); Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.
App. 2d 513, -, 327 P.2d 68, 71 (1958).
'
0People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 769-70, 349 P.2d 964, 973, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157 (1960);
Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 424, 340 P.2d 593, 594 (1959).
7 Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (1957).
"People v. Vick, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 484 P.2d 1372, 90 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1970); Walker v.
Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (1957).
"3Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 513, -, 327 P.2d 68, 73 (1958).
"Norton v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133, -, 343 P.2d 139, 141 (1959).
"CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1 (West 1970); CAL. PENAL CODE § 869 (West Supp. 1971).7 See note 15 & accomparying text supra.
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criminal defendant with a right to discovery depositions. 7 Unquestiona-
bly, the oral deposition is the most effective device in civil discovery. It
combines all of the benefits of written interrogatories and motions to
produce documents with the spontaneity and flexibility of cross-
examination. Its only drawback is that it is expensive, since the reporter
who transcribes the testimony must be paid. The deposition is, however,
available to the prosecution through the grand jury and other proce-
dures. It is essential to effective criminal defense discovery, which in
turn is essential to assure defendants a fair trial.
There have been developments on several fronts toward constitu-
tionalization of the standards of broad discovery. In other areas of
criminal procedure, the Constitution has been applied to control police
investigative practices even when enforcement of the constitutional lim-
its results in the suppression of reliable and probative prosecution evi-
dence and thereby diminishes the fact-finding effectiveness of the crimi-
nal trial.78 This has properly been done in the pursuit of fundamental
values that outweigh the importance of the conviction of any particular
law violator. The Constitution has also been applied to protect the right
of the defendant to an effective presentation of his defense at trial before
a proper tribunal through the right to counsel," the right of confronta-
tion,80 and the right to a jury trial.8' Equally appropriate for the imposi-
tion of constitutional standards is discovery as a procedure for assisting
a defendant in the ascertainment of the facts necessary to establish his
defense, complete or partial. Several constitutional provisions are well
adapted to this purpose. It is constitutionally as important that a defen-
dant be informed of the evidence as it is that he be informed of his rights.
As Judge J. Skelly Wright has said,
7The first state to provide for criminal discovery depositions was Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 6721-26 (Supp. 1971); see State v. Mahoney, 122 Vt. 456, 176 A.2d 747 (1961). Since
then Florida, Ohio, and Texas have followed suit. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220(f); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 2945.50 (Page Supp. 1970); State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St.
2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 39.02-.07 (1966), as amended, (Supp.
1972).
Many states permit a defendant to take evidence depositions, as opposed to discovery deposi-
tions, of witnesses whose testimony he would like to present but whose attendance at trial he cannot
obtain because of the witnesses' residence outside the jurisdiction or his physical incapacity. See,
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-32 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-74 (1969); FED. R. CRINI. P.
15; Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.10.
78E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).7 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
"lDuncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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These cases point up an anomaly of our criminal process: con-
trolled by rules of law protecting adversary rights and procedures at
some stages, the process at other stages is thoroughly unstructured.
Beside the carefully safeguarded fairness of the courtroom is a dark
no-man's-land of unreviewed bureaucratic and discretionary decision
making. Too often, what the process purports to secure in its formal
stages can be subverted or diluted in its more informal stages.12
The Due Process Clause. Many authorities have announced with-
out analysis that there is no constitutional right to defense discovery."
The United States Supreme Court has strongly favored defense discov-
ery, 4 but the Court's development of constitutional procedures to de-
liver it has been measured. In 1952 in Leland v. Oregon"5 the Court held
that "[w]hile it may be the better practice for the prosecution thus to
exhibit a confession,' 8  defendant suffered no prejudice, since the con-
fession he sought to discover was produced in court five days before he
rested his case and the trial judge offered him additional time to prepare
to meet it. In Clewis v. Texas 7 the Supreme Court cited Leland for the
proposition "that in some circumstances it may be a denial of due
process for a defendant to be refused any discovery of his statements to
sUnited States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
83E.g., Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59, 372 P.2d 919, 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881
(1962); State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 553-54, 557 (Fla. App. 1969); State v. Johnson, 28 N.J.
133, 136, 145 A.2d 313, 315 (1958); Traynor 242 n.77.
"'The Supreme Court has advocated discovery in its supervisory responsibility over the federal
courts as well as in its constitutional review function. In Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414,
419 (1953), the Court quoted the following language from People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 573, 18
N.W. 362, 363 (1884): "[T]he State has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of
the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused parties on the testimony of untrustworthy
persons."
In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Supreme Court held that at trial in federal
cases after a prosecution witness has testified the defendant is entitled to inspect pretrial reports
made to the government by the witness. At the time of the decision, Jencks represented an
important breakthrough in criminal discovery, though it applied only at trial. Congress codified
its rule in the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). See Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85
(1961). Later the Court held that the Jencks Act established the outer limits of the nature of
documents that the courts could compel the prosecution to disclose to the defendant. Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). The four concurring justices in Palermo said that although
Jencks did not have to be decided on constitutional grounds, "it would be idle to say that the
commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface of the decision .... " Id. at 362-63.
Federal discovery has now been expanded by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-343 U.S. 790 (1952).
1id. at 801.
-386 U.S. 707 (1967).
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the police."' s In the meantime in a series of cases beginning in 1934 and
culminating in Giles v. Maryland and Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme
Court developed the principle that it constitutes a violation of due pro-
cess of law for law enforcement agencies, police or prosecutor, know-
ingly to present or let stand uncontradicted false evidence or to withhold
from the defendant, intentionally or not, material exulpatory evidence
of any kind, including evidence useful only for impeachment of the
credibility of government witnesses. 9 The obvious corollary of this con-
stitutional principle is that the police and the prosecutor have a duty to
disclose such evidence to a defendant.
The foundation for this duty is the concept that the prosecuting
attorney "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compel-
ling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done."9 This concept has stimulated much of the state experimenta-
tion with discovery. Nevertheless, on several counts it has not matured
into a constitutional right to discovery.
First, the Supreme Court has never pinpointed the time at which
the disclosure must be made. Accordingly, the courts have denied mo-
tions for pre-trial discovery of all material and exculpatory evidence in
the possession of the prosecution on the ground that the prosecutor may
"Id. at 712 n.8. -In Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), the defendant entered a plea of
non vult contendere after having been denied pretrial discovery of the confessions he and two
friends had given the police. The court held there was no violation of due process in denial of the
requested discovery even though in this case, unlike Leland, the defendant never was shown the
confessions. In Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967), the Court cited Cicenia along with Leland
for the proposition that denial of discovery of confessions could in some circumstances constitute
a denial of due process. The defendants in both Cicenia and Leland suffered procedural difficulties
in raising the discovery due process issue. Had they been able to get their discovery motions before
the United States Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal before they had been tried or entered
a prejudicial plea the Court may have been better able to recognize their due process claims. See
Traynor 228.
The discovery issue in Cicenia was secondary to defendant's claim of a constitutional violation
in the taking of his confession while his attorney was asking to see him and while he was asking
for his attorney. The Court's holding on this issue was specifically overruled in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 479 n.48 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 & n.15 (1964).
"Giglio v. United States, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Miller
v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S.
607 (1960); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); White v.
Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935).
"Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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decide when to disclose such evidence and need not do so before trial."
One court explained this position as follows: "The Brady decision must
be understood to refer to the application of tests of fairness to the
prosecution at trial, and not at an earlier point in the proceedings."9
However, in applying the constitutional duty of disclosure, some courts
have interpreted it to require that disclosure be made in time for the
defendant to capitalize on it."
Secondly, the principle is limited to evidence that is both material
and exculpatory or favorable to defendant, although most courts have
declined to impose a further limitation that the evidence be admissible. 4
Thirdly, the courts have generally been content to leave the initial
determination of whether evidence fits within those two categories to the
prosecutor,95 although some require that evidence about which the pros-
ecutor is doubtful be sumitted to in camera inspection." Review of the
prosecutor's determination is available only if the defendant should by
chance learn of the existence of qualifying evidence 7 and raise the ques-
tion during trial or by means of a post-conviction remedy, such as
habeas corpus.
Experience with the disclosure duty has confirmed that the prosecu-
tor is not the proper person to charge with this responsibility. Because
of the unlikelihood that the defendant will ever learn of undisclosed
exculpatory information and because most discovered violations proba-
9E.g., United States v. Armantrout, 278 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd, 411 F.2d 60
(2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Wolfson, 289 F. Supp. 903, 914-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States
v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 553-
54 (Fla. App. 1969).
"2United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"E.g., United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v.
Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State ex rel. Dooley v. Connall,__ Ore.
, -, 475 P.2d 582, 586 (1970).
"'E.g., United States v. Jordan, 399 F.2d 610, 615 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1005
(1968); United States v. Avella, 395 F.2d 762, 763 (3d Cir. 1968); North Am. Rockwell Corp. v.
NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 873 (10th Cir. 1968); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"United States v. Curry, 278 F. Supp. 508, 513 (N.D. I1l. 1967); United States v. Cobb, 271
F. Supp. 159, 164 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800-01 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1105 (1969).
"The difficulty for defendants in ever learning of the existence of undisclosed exculpatory
evidence is illustrated in United States ex rel. Hill v. Deegan, 268 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Other nondisclosure cases do not reveal how the defendant came upon the undisclosed evidence.
In Deegan a witness who had testified earlier told an assistant prosecutor that he had made a
mistake in his testimony. The assistant told the prosecutor, who did nothing. The defendant learned
about the incident only when one week later the witness came to trial himself to correct the error.
See also Lee v. United States, 388 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1968).
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bly are remedied at the trial court level, it is reasonable to assume that
the reported cases represent only a small fraction of the prosecutions in
which such circumstances actually existed, and only a sample of those
reported cases is discussed here.
In many cases in which a man has been sentenced to death for
murder, the prosecutor has been found to have withheld material evi-
dence that might have exculpated the defendant or at least mitigated the
culpability of his involvement. Several cases have involved circumstan-
ces in which the defendant was hampered in establishing a claim of self-
defense because the prosecutor withheld from him the fact that a
weapon, such as a knife, had been found on the person of the victim or
in the area where his body was found. 8 In State v. Thompson99 the
prosecutor withheld from the defendant the fact that shell casings had
been found at the scene of the homicide and that laboratory reports
showed that the shells were from the gun of defendant's companion
rather than that of defendant. This evidence might have tended to ab-
solve defendant of responsibility for the crime because there may not
have been a showing of complicity between the two that would render
the defendant responsible for the acts of his companion. The killing
apparently took place spontaneously when police officers stopped the
car in which defendant was a passenger. In another death case, People
v. Murdock,10 the defendant admitted that in pursuance of a burglary
he had entered through a window the premises where a woman was
raped and murdered but denied having committed the rape or murder.
Testimony by police that the door to the premises was locked when they
arrived at the scene "played . . .a key role in the circumstantial evi-
dence against the defendant."101 Nevertheless, the prosecutor did not tell
defendant that a fifteen-year-old girl had informed the police that on the
day the body was found she had entered the premises and at that time
the door was unlocked.
Several death penalty cases have involved the prosecutor's with-
holding of evidence that the defendant could use to prove that he had
not done the actual killing. In Brady v. Maryland"2 the prosecutor
exhibited to defendant several statements made by his co-defendant but
"
8 Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704 (1949); State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 422 P.2d 125
(1967).
0396 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1965).
1-39 II1. 2d 553, 237 N.E.2d 442 (1968).
I .d, at 560, 237 N.E.2d at 446.
102373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Smith v. Urban, - Ark. -, 434 S.W.2d 283 (1968).
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not one in which the co-defendant named himself as the trigger man.
In United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi,'03 the prosecutor failed to
disclose that a blood-stained bullet had been found near the body of the
slain police officer; that the bullet was of a calibre that other police
officers at the scene had been using; and that it had not been fired from
the gun of the defendant.
In United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 04 the defendant tried
to establish that because he was intoxicated at the time of the killing,
he lacked either the competency required for first degree murder or, at
least, the culpability to deserve the death penalty. The prosecutor did
not disclose to defendant that the officer who had arrested him within
four hours of the crime had told the prosecutor that defendant then
appeared to be under the influence of liquor. In Ashley v. Texas'0 the
prosecutor withheld psychiatric reports that defendant was not compe-
tent to stand trial. In Alcorta v. Texas'06 the defendant claimed that he
killed his wife when he caught her kissing one Castilleja in a parked car
late at night. When Castilleja told the prosecutor that he and defen-
dant's wife had had sexual intercourse five or six times, the prosecutor
told him not to volunteer that information. The prosecutor never dis-
closed this evidence to the defendant before trial-not even when Castil-
leja testified during trial that he and defendant's wife were not in love
and had not had any dates.
Other murder cases not involving capital punishment have been
prolific sources of violation of the prosecutorial disclosure duty. In
Hamric v. Bailey17 the defendant, who was alone at home while her
husband was out, shot her neighbor. She claimed that he was trying to
climb into her house through a window. The prosecution introduced a
dying declaration of the victim that he was on his property ten feet from
defendant's house when he was shot. The prosecutor did not disclose
that a laboratory examination of the victim's shirt showed slivers of
wood and glass that arguably indicated that the victim was at the win-
dow when shot. In McMullen v. Maxwell" 8 the prosecutor did not
disclose to defendant that before he was arrested the police had re-
covered from robbers, who were not known to have any connection with
1-195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
101221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
1-5319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
108355 U.S. 28 (1957).
107386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967).
1'3 Ohio St. 2d 160, 209 N.E.2d 449 (1965).
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defendant, a gun, also not shown to have any connection with defendant,
that ballistics tests showed had fired one or both of the bullets that killed
the man of whose murder defendant was convicted. In State v.
Vigliano0 9 the state withheld the fact that one of its witnesses had been
committed to a mental hospital during the pendency of the proceedings.
In In re Kapatos"0 a witness stated to the prosecuting attorney and the
grand jury that after hearing "backfiring" he had looked out his window
at the scene of the crime and had seen two men, neither of whom was
defendant, running and getting into a moving car.
Rape cases provide further experience with the failure of the disclo-
sure duty to protect adequately the defendant's interests. In United
States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen,"' the prosecutor did not disclose
to defendant that a doctor had examined the prosecutrix and reported
that she was still a virgin. In Giles v. Maryland"' the two defendants
claimed that the prosecutrix had consented to intercourse with one of
them and had not had intercourse with the other. The prosecution with-
held evidence that the sixteen-year-old girl was on probation; that she
later at a party had engaged in sexual relations with two men in circum-
stances that suggested that she had consented; that she reported that
these same two men had raped her and later retracted that charge; that
she often had engaged in sexual relations with boys and men, some of
whom she did not know; and that she had tried to commit suicide. The
prosecution also withheld a police report that quoted her and her boy
friend as telling the police that when defendants approached them they
were having intercourse in the back of the car. At trial the prosecutor
said nothing when the boy friend testified that he had not taken the girl
out in order to have sex with her. In In re Wright"' the prosecutor did
1-50 N.J. 51, 232 A.2d 129 (1967). See also Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1961),
in which the prosecutor successfully blocked cross-examination of a prosecution witness about his
mental condition, although he knew that the witness had been in mental institutions in three states.
110208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
"'86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. III. 1949).
112386 U.S. 66 (1967). See also Smallwood v. Warden, 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962).
113282 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Ark. 1968). See also Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th
Cir. 1968). The defendant in that case was a black man who was charged with the rape of a white
woman. The prosecutor gave him the name of a witness but did not advise him that the witness
had stated that the attacker was not black but light skinned. The prosecutor subpoenaed the witness
but did not call her to testify.
In United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967), the defendant was charged with
kidnapping. At trial the alleged victim testified that defendant took her across state lines against
her will and twice had sexual intercourse with her. A Dr. Stolar had examined the girl and found
no evidence of intercourse or injury. The prosecutor gave the defendant a list of witnesses that
[Vol. 50
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not disclose that police had been given a purse that had been taken from
the victim's house on the night of the rape and that had been found,
along with a ladies' girdle and several rectal syringes, under the house
of another person. The purse had been found by the residents of the
house, who were the parents of a fugitive suspected of having committed
a different rape.
In People v. Say.ides"4 the prosecutor, knowing that his witness had
been promised leniency in connection with charges then pending against
him in return for his testimony at the trial of defendant, failed to dis-
close this information to defendant and elicited testimony by the witness
denying any promise of leniency. In United States v. Miller"' the prose-
cutor did not advise defendant that along with a person he considered
an expert in hypnosis, the prosecutor had hypnotized an important wit-
ness to try to jog his memory. At the hearing on defendant's challenge
to this nondisclosure, there was testimony on defendant's behalf that the
hypnosis procedure employed was highly suggestive.
It is entirely appropriate to enlist prosecuting attorneys as advo-
cates for abstract justice who are impartially concerned with exonerat-
ing the innocent as well as convicting the guilty and to base substantive
principles of prosecutorial conduct on the requirements of such a mag-
nanimous role. These cases demonstrate that it is quite another thing
to indulge in assumptions that this noble duty in fact describes the
performance of prosecutors. The austere ambivalence that is com-
manded is beyond the capacity of anyone who is also expected to per-
form an advocate's role. A judge may be expected to conform to this
high standard of impartiality; a prosecutor may be asked only to try his
best.
The instances of deliberate prosecutorial presentation of false or
perjured evidence," 6 though not unsubstantial or innocuous, are not
important to us here, for hopefully they are aberrations. Expansive
discovery would surely help minimize their occurrence, but our concern
included the name of the FBI Agent to whom Dr. Stolar had reported his finding but not that of
Dr. Stolar himself. At the preliminary hearing, the girl erroneously testifed that she had been
examined by a Dr. Green. Defendant's attorney was unable to locate a Dr. Green. By impeaching
the girl's credibility as to the sexual intercourse, Dr. Stolar's testimony might also have raised a
doubt about her testimony that she was kidnapped. See also Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933 (4th
Cir. 1966).
'1l N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956).
"411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969).
"'E.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
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should be primarily with the routine case. The elaborate machinery of
discovery might be considered unjustifiably cumbersome if its purpose
were only to combat infrequent deviations from a due process norm, for
protection from which the disclosure duty might render adequate serv-
ice.
Rather, there are two additional reasons why the administration of
defendant's discovery rights should not be entrusted to prosecutors.
First, the responsibility of the prosecutor as an advocate is so demand-
ing of his energies and concentration that he cannot be equally attentive
to the preparation of his adversary's defense. In most of the foregoing
cases, the prosecutor should have been aware of the importance of the
undisclosed evidence to the defendant. In some of the cases, the prosecu-
tor tried to justify his nondisclosure on the ground that the withheld
evidence would not have been admissible in court. The argument was
essentially that the evidence was of no use to the defendant. In other
cases the prosecutor may have frankly believed in the defendant's guilt
despite the existence of the exculpatory evidence; in none of the cases
discussed did the evidence conclusively establish the innocence of the
defendant.
Secondly, even if the prosecutor were conscientiously dedicated to
ferreting out from all that passes through his files whatever might help
the defendant, unless he was initiated into all the nuances of the defense
theories he would not be able to recognize much information that could
render valuable service for the defendant. The defense may see signifi-
cance in facts otherwise appearing neutral. Necessarily minimizing the
significance of the several bits of inconsistent or contradictory data that
commonly accumulate in the course of litigation, the prosecutor will
often underestimate or overlook the significance that such data might
have in the hands of the defendant's advocate. Often the police do not
even present to the prosecutor information in their possession that
should be disclosed to the defendant.117 Understandably, the prosecutor
is not always as aggressive as a defense attorney might be in pursuing
the investigating officers for such information.
In many "negligent nondisclosure" cases, the prosecutor did not
make disclosure only because, lacking the insight of an advocate for the
defendant, he had reasonably not perceived the usefulness of the evi-
"'United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Luna v. Beto, 391 F.2d 329 (5th




dence to the defendant. The negligent nondisclosure cases illustrate cir-
cumstances in which the prosecutor could not be said to have acted
unfairly in failing to cull from all the evidence in his file the particular
item that defendant, upon somehow later learning of it, was able to show
would have been useful to his defense.
In People v. Whitmore"8 the defendant was convicted of rape. The
victim had pulled a button from the coat worn by her attacker. The
report of a laboratory analysis of the button and of defendant's coat
stated that the buttons on the coat were difference in size, design, and
construction from the seized button and that the threads were different
in color, diameter, and degree of twist. Nevertheless, the report con-
cluded: "'It was not possible to determine whether or not the Q-1
button had been attached to the K-1 coat.' 119 This conclusion was
reasonable since the coat was an old one and the button could have been
one sewed on to replace an original button that had been lost. The
prosecutor did not disclose the report to defendant because he believed
that it was not probative or admissible. Not surprisingly, he was unable
to conceive the usefulness of the report to defendant, though defense
counsel could have. Its introduction into evidence would have estab-
lished the scientifically analyzed difference between the seized button
and the buttons on the coat. Defense counsel in argument would proba-
bly have conceded that these differences did not conclusively establish
that the button did not come from defendant's coat. However, he could
have gone on to urge that, taken with any other evidence in defendant's
favor, the lack of similarity might be another circumstance pointing
toward defendant's innocence.
The court agreed that the prosecutor had acted in good faith. Still
it held that there had been a violation of due process, reasoning that
"[w]hen there is substantial room for doubt the prosecution is not to
decide for the court what is admissible or what for the defense may be
useful." 20
Branch v. State" is another example of negligent nondisclosure.
Defendant, who was charged with murder, claimed that he had acted in
self-defense when the victim had chased him with a knife. Witnesses
testified that the victim did not have a knife. However, a man had
1145 Misc. 2d 506, 257 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
"'id. at __, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
'2Id. at __, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 811-12.
121469 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
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delivered a knife to the police that he said had been found at the scene
of the murder. Understandably, the prosecutor did not credit the evi-
dence because such a post-event finding by a non-law enforcement offi-
cer whose connection with defendant was not known, without more, was
tenuous at best in terms of establishing that the victim had had the knife
at the time he was killed. As the court held, however, "That information
could very well have enabled defense counsel to conduct further and
possibly fruitful investigation regarding the finding of the knife."',
A final example is Levin v. Katzenbach,2 3 in which defendant was
convicted of grand larceny in connection with a conspiracy to fix a trial.
Three union officials testified with regard to the manner in which money
was obtained from a bank and delivered to defendant for the purpose
of bribing the necessary parties. They also testified that defendant kept
the money for himself. The testimony of one of the witnesses was incon-
sistent with that of the other two in connection with the exchanging of
one-thousand-dollar bills for twenty-dollar bills at the bank that origi-
nally furnished the money. The prosecutor did not disclose to defendant
that an officer and a teller of the bank had told him that although they
remembered providing the large bills they did not remember having
exchanged them for smaller ones. Especially in view of the fact that
defendant knew about the bank witnesses and had interviewed them, the
prosecutor can certainly be forgiven for not being concerned that defen-
dant be told about them. Nevertheless, this evidence might have been
useful to defendant in impeaching at least one of the witnesses against
him as to a nonessential part of the illegal transaction that the witness
described. With Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger dissenting, the court
held that the nondisclosure violated due process.
The teaching of these cases is that for a variety of reasons the
prosecutor is not the proper party to entrust with the responsibility for
deciding what information in his possession the defendant needs ade-
quately to defend himself. Nor is the disclosure function a proper one
for the judge to perform. He is ordinarily even less oriented to the facts
in the case and the possible defenses to the charge than is the prosecuting
attorney. Requiring him to review the prosecution's files, sensitive to
information useful to the defendant, would dangerously tempt him into
the thought process of a defense advocate; he would then be an investi-
'hid. at 534.




gator for the defendant or he could not adequately discharge the respon-
sibility. This delicate assignment would also distract the judge from his
judicial functions. It would necessarily be laborious and time-consuming
as long as the prevailing rule continued to make discovery turn on
exceptional circumstances.12 4
In addition to the category of material and exculpatory evidence,
the United States Supreme Court has held prosecuting attorneys to a
duty of disclosure in all cases of certain specific items of evidence,
whether exculpatory or not. In Roviaro v. United States'21 the Court
held that the prosecution may not claim a privilege to withhold from
the defendant the name of an informer who might have information
relevant to the question of his guilt or innocence. 2 ' The Court said:
Where the disclosure of an informant's identity, or of the contents of
his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an ac-
cused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege
must give way. In these situations the trial court may require disclo-
sure and, if the Government withholds the information, dismiss the
action. 127
Although Roviaro was tried in a federal court and although in
reaching its decision the Supreme Court may have relied on its supervi-
sory power over the rules of evidence in federal courts, 128 it did argue
that disclosure was necesitated by "the fundamental requirements of
fairness."'' 2  Defendant had sought disclosure of the informer's name
and address in a motion for a bill of particulars before triall30 and at
trial. The prosecutor had interposed a claim of privilege on both occa-
"'See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182, 184 (1969); Dennis v. United States,
384 U.S. 855, 874 (1966); United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United
States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1'353 U.S. 53 (1957).
'Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
"'Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
'13See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309, 311 (1967).
'"Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957).
'°In Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court found a denial of due process in
the deliberate misrepresentation by the prosecution of paint on the undershorts that it claimed
defendant wore when he committed a sexual murder as blood of the victim's type. The Court said:
"Prior to his trial in an Illinois court, his counsel filed a motion for an order permitting a scientific
inspection of the physical evidence the prosecution intended to introduce. The motion was resisted
by the prosecution and denied by the court." Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). The Court did not make
further reference to this motion for pretrial discovery, since it went on to hold that there was a
violation of the prosecution's disclosure duty. Had the motion been granted, however, the due
process problem could have been obviated.
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sions. The Court held that defendant was entitled to disclosure at trial
and also to pretrial discovery of "John Doe's identity and address."',
Roviaro involved discovery of the identity of a material witness as
to whom the prosecutor presented a special plea for confidentiality
based upon an assumed danger to the witness and a governmental need
to maintain the informer's cover to protect his serviceability to law
enforcement. In the face of this position, the Court recognized that "the
fundamental requirements of fairness"'3 2 dictate that the defendant's
interest in the names of material witnesses outweighs the Government's
interest in secrecy. In evaluating the content of fundamental fairness it
would be hard to distinguish between an informer and any other mate-
rial witness in terms of whether his identity or statements should be
disclosed to the defendant.
Here, there was not even a requirement that the informant possess
exculpatory information; rather, it was required only that he might have
material information so that disclosure would be "relevant and helpful
to the defense of an accused, or . . . essential to a fair determination
of a cause."133 Moreover, Roviaro would seem to require disclosure
to a defendant in advance of trialof all statements that the witnesses
have given to the prosecution. Apparently the Court in Roviaro would
have required "disclosure of an informant's identity, or of the contents
of his communication,"' 34 if the defendant had requested discovery of
statements. The discovery requirement should apply to all witnesses'
statements. Whether or not Roviaro has significance in connection with
witnesses other than informers who are in the "employ" of law enforce-
ment, to whatever extent its rule was derived from the Constitution
Roviaro certainly establishes a constitutional impact on discovery.
The Sixth Amendment. General due process is not the only consti-
tutional provision that is important for discovery. The sixth amendment
provides a defendant with the rights "to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." All of these provi-
sions speak to an underlying constitutional policy of broad discovery.
Only the right to counsel has so far been developed toward that end.







The defendant, even if not indigent and not in custody pending trial,
does not have the investigative resources of the prosecution. A further
important factor that increases the necessity of defense discovery is the
indigent character of most criminal defendants. Because of this, most
defendants are unable without official backing35 to conduct an inde-
pendent factual investigation of the scope necessary to collect useful
evidence. In addition, all defendants are subject to a natural handicap
in investigation. By the time that they are called upon to prepare a
defense and to engage legal representation, the prosecution has already
tried to acquire for itself all of the evidence. The scene, if any, of the
crime, has likely been stripped of its evidence. Unless it is a public place
or on property belonging to the defendant or his friends, he may not
even be allowed to examine it. Witnesses selected for use by the prosecu-
tion may be reluctant to talk to him or his lawyer. If there has been a
substantial time lapse since the commission of the crime, the memories
of these or other witnesses may be stale until refreshed by previous
statements. The right to counsel is empty without the means of obtain-
ing information about the strength or weakness of the prosecution's case
on the basis of which to advise and defend the client or of obtaining
evidence to use to establish the client's innocence, to mitigate his culpa-
bility, or to minimize his punishment.
The Supreme Court has not yet pronounced a general right of
discovery as part of the right to counsel. On the other hand, in connec-
tion with lineup identifications by eyewitnesses, the Court has promul-
gated a constitutional principle of discovery that adheres to the right to
counsel.
In United States v. Wade'36 the Court held that the sixth and
fourteenth amendments guarantee a defendant the right to counsel at a
lineup. The rationale for the decision was that the lineup is a critical
confrontation at which the presence of counsel "is necessary to preserve
the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right mean-
ingfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective
assistance of counsel at the trial itself."' 137 The Court made clear that
"'Some jurisdictions with public defender systems may provide the public defender with
investigative resources. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-468 (1969): "Each public defender is entitled
to the services of one investigator, to be appointed by the defender to serve at his pleasure. The
Administrative Officer of the Courts shall fix the compensation of each investigator, and may
authorize additional investigators, full-time or part-time, upon a showing of need."
136388 U.S. 218 (1967).
1id. at 227.
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the reason the lineup was a critical stage of the proceeding for counsel's
help was that the defendant would be able to obtain information about
the procedures employed and any identifications obtained there. Defen-
dant's attorney would be able to gather two kinds of information: infor-
mation with which to challenge the fairness of the lineup and informa-
tion with which to cross-examine any witnesses who identify his client
as involved in the crime charged. Examples of information that is poten-
tially useful in cross-examination are whether the witness did attend a
lineup, 138 whether the witness identified someone other than the defen-
dant as the culprit, whether the witness gave some indication of uncer-
tainty in his identification of the defendant, and whether there were
suggestive influences that tended to cause the defendant to stand out
from among the others in the lineup group. 39 The attorney might even
learn of a witness who is unable to identify the defendant as a partici-
pant in the crime or who is certain that he was not a participant. Proba-
bly, the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose to defendant all
material and exculpatory information in his possession would require
disclosure of all of this information, and particularly the last. In United
States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 4' however, the prosecutor never dis-
closed to defendants that two eyewitnesses to the robbery had said after
a lineup that one of the defendants positively was not one of the rob-
bers. "'41
The attorney's ability directly to observe the identification process
overcomes the problems inherent in relying upon the prosecutor's deter-
mination of what should be disclosed. Of course, the attorney's presence
is also designed to detect unfairness that violates due process standards,
'In Ex parte Cherry, 456 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), the prosecution did not
disclose that a witness had identified defendant in a lineup, even though the witness testified at
trial that she had not viewed any lineup.
' 
3 These suggestive influences may or may not amount to unfairness in violation of due
process. Even if they are serious enough to violate that standard, the witness might be allowed to
identify defendant in court if he satisfies the trial judge that his identification is based on his having
seen the defendant at the time of the crime and is completely independent of the lineup. United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-41 (1967). In either event, defense counsel might want to
impeach the identification by proving to the jury that it was unreliable because tainted by sugges-
tion.
10326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
"'See Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481 (1967). Jon 0. Newman, former United
States Attorney for Connecticut, reported having asked a large group of state prosecutors at a
conference whether they should disclose to the defense the name of a witness who, after viewing




even though this too should be subject to the duty to disclose. As the
Court in Wade said, "In short, the accused's inability effectively to
reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup may de-
prive him of his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility
of the witness' courtroom identification."''
Wade is thus essentially a constitutional discovery case.4a It is
easy to understand, therefore, why the Court left open the possibility
of the presence at the lineup of substitute counsel as sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional standard. The Court explained that this might be
necessary to avoid delay.' It also might be useful since, to the extent
the defendant might have to produce independent evidence of the lineup,
someone other than himself or the attorney representing him would be
in a better position to testify. The lineup is not a time when counsel is
needed for the advice he can give or the presentation he can make. The
defendant may be required to participate in identification exercises in a
lineup, and probably his attorney will not take an active part in the
lineup. Counsel is needed at the lineup primarily for the discovery he
can obtain.
The lineup can be bifurcated into two phases-one in which the
defendant and others are shown to the witness and another, conducted
later and separately, in which the witness advises the law enforcement
officers whether he was able to identify any of the persons presented to
him. If more than one witness to the same or different crimes involving
the same or different suspects attends the showup at the same time, the
better practice would be to permit no identification to be announced
while the witnesses are together. Otherwise, there is a risk of suggestion
to the other witnesses if one does make a positive identification. Wade
did not speak to the question of whether the constitutional right to
counsel would apply at the identification as well as the confrontation
phase of such a lineup. The Court was aware, however, of the dangers
of suggestion in the identification process as well as in the production
of the showup and presumably would apply the right to counsel. to
discovery of both. 45
reUnited States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1967).
'"See Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance? 17
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 339 (1969).
'eUnited States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
'That was the conclusion reached by the California Supreme Court in People v. Williams, 3
Cal. 3d 853, 478 P.2d 942, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1971), at least where the identification takes place
immediately after the show up.
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If identification is an issue in a case and if the police have not
conducted a lineup, the defendant should be entitled to have one at his
request. He may need protection against the suggestive character of an
in-court identification while he is sitting conspicuously at counsel table.
No greater inconvenience to government witnesses would be caused
than by a police-initiated lineup. Unless the witness willingly cooper-
ates, which is particularly unlikely if he was the crime victim, the defen-
dant needs access to compulsory process for this potentially beneficial
procedure; he needs the power to compel an identification deposition.
Coleman v. Alabama'48 holds out promise for this and more.
A recent Supreme Court decision, Coleman contains an expansive
significance for the role of the right to counsel in the constitution-
alization of discovery standards. Coleman held that the preliminary
hearing is a critical stage of a state's criminal process at which the
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel.'47 In reaching that deci-
sion, the Court found four functions for which "the guiding hand of
counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential."' Two of those func-
tions deal with discovery, and the Court described them as follows:
[T]he skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can
fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the
State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the
accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. [Also], trained
counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has against his
client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet
that case at the trial.14 9
The Court's recognition of the usefulness of the preliminary hear-
ing for discovery, and impliedly of the propriety of using it for that
purpose, is significant in itself. State law-including that of Alabama,
whose preliminary hearing procedure was under scrutiny in
Coleman-ordinarily holds that-the only purpose of a preliminary hear-
ing is that of screening to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
"6399 U.S. 1 (1970).
"'In Adams v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 916 (1972), the Supreme Court held that Coleman applies
only to cases in which a preliminary hearing was conducted after the date Coleman was decided.
"'399 U.S. at 9.
1id. The Court described the other two functions as follows: "ITjhe lawyer's skilled examina-
tion and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may
lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. . . . [Clounsel can also be influential at
the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the
necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail." Id.
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against the accused to warrant continuing the criminal proceedings al-
ready underway against him. 5' In Alabama it is a prelude to the grand
jury proceeding; in other states it is an alternative to the grand jury as
a buffer between the State and the accused in the determination of
whether to subject him to the expense, inconvenience, and embarrass-
ment of a criminal trial."5 ' Doctrinally, therefore, it has been thought
that it may not be used for discovery. On the other hand, as a matter
of practice it is commonplace for defense attorneys to exploit the discov-
ery potential in the preliminary hearing.. 2 Until the decision in
Coleman, this practice was of dubious legality under state law. Coleman
has sanctioned it out of the constitutional necessity for discovery. The
potential impact of Coleman can be sensed only upon realizing that it
is a first step toward a constitutional right to criminal defense deposi-
tions.5 3 It is, however, only one step.
Coleman does not guarantee that a defendant will be provided this
discovery opportunity. It does provide that if there is a preliminary
hearing, the defendant has a right to be represented at it by counsel,
largely so that discovery may be obtained. Many cases have held, how-
ever, that no constitutional requirement is contravened if presentation
of the case to a grand jury, which is at the option of the prosecution, is
substituted for the preliminary hearing. 54 These holdings are, however,
based on the assumption that the only function of the preliminary hear-
ing is its buffer function of screening for probable cause-a function
that they reason is as well performed by the grand jury. Although
'"Old. at 8; Thompson v. General Fin. Co., 205 Kan. 76, 94-95, 468 P.2d 269, 284-85 (1970);
State v. Richardson, 347 S.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Mo. 1962); Fugate v. Ronin, 167 Neb. 70, 77, 91
N.W.2d 240, 244-45 (1958); Overton v. State, 78 Nev. 198, 201, 370 P.2d 677, 679 (1962).
'See generally Steele, supra note 19, at 193-94 n.l.
152See Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and
Legal-Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 916, 920-25 (1971).
' In Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that an
indigent defendant has a right to a free transcript of his preliminary hearing.
"'Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1967); Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649,
655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Dillard v. Bomar, 342 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir. 1965); Vincent v. United
States, 337 F.2d 891, 896 (8th Cir. 1964); Odell v. Burke, 281 F.2d 782, 786 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 875 (1960); Barrett v. United States, 270 F.2d 772, 775-76 (8th Cir. 1959); Barber v.
United States, 142 F.2d 805, 807 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 741 (1944); McDonald v.
Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 196, 199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 665 (1942); Moore v. Aderhold,
108 F.2d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 1939); Garrison v. Johnston, 104 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 553 (1939); State v. Grant, 9 N.C. App. 704, 705-06, 177 S.E.2d 314, 314-15 (1970). But
cf. Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 559-60 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894,
901 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965); Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715, 717-18
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
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Coleman did not take up this issue, its holding that the discovery func-
tion of the preliminary hearing is constitutionally protected by a defen-
dant's right to counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments
surely impairs the validity of the necessary assumption in those cases
that all of the protections of the preliminary hearing are provided by
the grand jury procedure.
In Adams v. Illinois,54 ." in which the Supreme Court held that
Coleman applies prospectively only, the plurality opinion for the Court
recognized that there are "limitations upon the use of the preliminary
hearing for discovery and impeachment purposes . *.".. ,,1 2 The opin-
ion specified two such limitations. First, the court may have authority
to terminate the preliminary hearing once probable cause is established;
secondly, the evidence gathered by the prosecution and thus subject to
discovery at that time may be incomplete. Significantly, the opinion did
not acknowledge the availability of the grand jury alternative as a limi-
tation on the discovery usefulness of the preliminary hearing. Although
tthe absence of such a reference may be attributable to the focus of the
opinion on limitations arising out of the preliminary hearing procedure
itself, in view of the notoriety of the grand jury as an alternative to the
preliminary hearing it seems reasonable to read into that opinion a
purpose to avoid sanctioning such a denial of discovery opportunities.
Even if the defendant were held to have a right to the transcript of
the grand jury proceedings, those proceedings would still not be an
adequate vehicle for discovery unless Coleman is applied to extend to
the defendant a right to counsel in those traditionally secret inquiries.
Such an extension would inhibit the investigative role of the grand jury,
in which the reasons given for grand jury secrecy are apt if at all. Also,
a right to counsel before the grand jury might prove unworkable; each
witness could easily be represented, but often the grand jury might not
know who the defendant would be until it completed its deliberations.
Without interfering with the investigatory usefulness of the grand
jury, Coleman could be interpreted to provide a constitutional right to
a preliminary hearing 55 or some equally satisfactory deposition proce-
dure. It seems significant that one criminal procedure specified in the
"5''92 S. Ct. 916 (1972).
121d. at 919.
"'For discussions of the discovery function of the preliminary hearing in England and Canada
see DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 112-16 (1958); Brennan, supra note 5, at
284, 293; Louisell, 49 CALIF. L. REv., supra note 11, at 65-66; Traynor, Ground Lost and Found
in Criminal Discovery in England, supra note 6.
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Bill of Rights that has not been applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment is the fifth amendment's provision for indictment by
grand jury.' This has left room for the preliminary hearing to develop.
The Constitutional Dimensions of Defense Discovery
Efficient discovery could be delivered by a program that required
disclosure to the defendant upon the occasion of his first arraignment
of the contents of the files of the investigating and the prosecuting
authorities, 57 except for the prosecutor's work product and subject to
the prosecutor's right to apply for a protective order. The second phase
of the discovery program, at least in prosecutions for serious crimes,
should be the preliminary hearing as described in Coleman or some
alternative procedure for discovery depositions. The disclosure should
be made sufficiently in advance of the preliminary hearing or deposition
to enable the defense attorney to complete his discovery there by sub-
poenaing the witnesses he wants to depose and being able to prepare to
depose them effectively. 5 8
There is substantial justification for excepting the prosecutor's
work product, properly understood. However, the definition of such
work product should be carefully limited to reports, memoranda, or
correspondence in which evidence, testimony, or legal research is evalu-
ated or is compiled in summary form for at least one of the following
purposes: to serve as a basis for investigation or for the preparation of
trial briefs; to plot an overall course of strategy; or to synthesize prelimi-
nary or speculative information.
The justification for this exception is twofold. The most important
one is that the work-product information, although useful in planning
defense strategy, is not essential for the substance of the defense if the
defendant is given full discovery of the factual information underlying
the reports or memoranda. The defendant is not thereby denied access
"'Alexander v. Louisiana, 92 S. Ct. 1221, 1227 (1972); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586,
590 (1913); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
"'In Israel the defendant in all criminal cases has a right to inspect all the evidence in
possession of the prosecution except state or defense secrets, which also cannot then be used against
him. Shalgi, Criminal Discovery in Israel, 4 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 155 (1966).
1581n California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the preliminary
hearing testimony of a witness who is unavailable to testify at trial despite good faith efforts to
produce him may be admitted in transcript form against the defendant at trial. Therefore,
disclosure of the files should be made in advance of the preliminary hearing to protect a defendant's
right to prepare a thorough cross-examination of witnesses at that time in case their preliminary
hearing testimony is used at trial.
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to any factual data that he needs to prepare to meet the prosecution's
case or to present his own. Excluding any evaluation or planning by the
law enforcement officers, notes taken by the police or prosecutor of the
oral statement of a witness should properly be discoverable and not
within the work-product exception. The defendant might find in those
notes some evidence that he could use in establishing his defense or some
information given at the interview with the witness that is in conflict
with the witness' trial testimony and that the defendant might use to
impeach him. It is a mistake, therefore, to include any such raw investi-
gative data in the work-product exception. The exception should cover
only the subjective interpretation or development of such factual data
by the police or the prosecutor.
Since no unfairness to the defendant is involved, the second aspect
of the justification for this exception is that the prosecution has a legiti-
mate concern for the privacy of its processes of thinking. This concern
is materially different from any reasons that the prosecution might
advance for maintaining the secrecy of evidence that it has uncovered.
In order for the prosecutor to be able to make the most effective use of
the evidence, shared now with the defendant, he must be given the
freedom to speculate, to ruminate, and to consult without the fear that
every chance thought might be disclosed to the defendant. He must not
be inhibited in the planning of his case as he ponders and discards
unworkable theories, debates the weaknesses in his case, and explores
the strengths. Because the definition of work product is narrow and
specific and capable of application by one untutored in the defense
plans, the prosecutor should not have the difficulties in determining
what he may lawfully withhold that he has had in deciding what he must
lawfully disclose.
This carefully confined work-product exception should designate
the only general category of information in the possession of the prose-
cution that need not be exhibited to the defendant. Specific information
should be denied discovery in specific cases only upon a showing of
probable cause to believe that the defendant in the particular case would
misuse the particular evidence, but even then only if a less restrictive
protective order could not be effectively fashioned. Except to the extent
of the judicially recognized privilege to withhold the identity of an in-
former material only on the issue of probable cause for a search or
seizure and not on the issue of guilt or innocence,'59 the prosecution
'
5 2McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
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should be permitted to claim any other privilege not to disclose informa-
tion and thus protect any interest it has in the secrecy of the information
only by dismissing the charges against the defendant, since it may
thereby be precluding him from effective preparation of a defense. 6
The trial judge should not be given discretion in this regard. The
defendant should have a right to discovery. As the United States Su-
preme Court said in Dennis v. United States,6 ' "In our adversary sys-
tem for determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable for the
prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact.
Exceptions to this are justifiable only by the clearest and most compel-
ling considerations."
This discovery procedure need not be costly in time or expense. The
efficiency of the file-disclosure phase might be enhanced if the prosecu-
tor were routinely to deliver to the defense attorney at the first arraign-
ment of his client photocopies of all the non-work-product documents
in his files and in the files of the police and to supplement this periodi-
cally as the files are augmented with new information. If the defendant
is not indigent, perhaps he could be charged the duplicating costs.
A state might find it convenient to supply an alternative procedure
to the preliminary hearing in order to dispense with the attendance of
the magistrate. His presence would not be important to the securing of
discovery. The crucial attribute of the preliminary hearing for discovery
is its subpoena power. Although the prosecutor is not required to pres-
ent his entire case at the preliminary hearing, the defendant can sub-
poena any witnesses whom he wants to examine. If this power were
provided in a less formal deposition format, as it is in civil cases, the
importance of the preliminary hearing for discovery would no longer
exist.
The expense of the deposition reporter could also be borne by non-
indigent defendants. There would be an expense to the state in providing
a reporter for indigent defendants; however, this could be minimized by
putting reporters on salary rather than by contracting with them on a
piece-work, payment per page basis. In addition, a state might permit
the use of written interrogatories by defendants preliminary to or as a
substitute for oral depositions.
110"[l]n criminal causes '. . . the Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the
price of letting the defendant go free' Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957); accord,
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957).
11384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966).
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In terms of time the deposition procedure is likely to be demanding
on prosecution and defense counsel. Considering that as a matter of
practice defense attorneys already use the preliminary hearing for dis-
covery, it would not seem that in the majority of cases there would be
a prohibitive increment of time demanded beyond that already devoted
to the grand jury, preliminary hearing, and informal investigation, in-
cluding the interviewing of witnesses. Moreover, a broad discovery pro-
cedure might serve the cause of judicial economy by encouraging guilty
pleas by guilty defendants who thereby learn the character of the case
against them,'62 encouraging dismissal of groundless cases, 163 streamlin-
ing trials, 16 4 and reducing the difficulty in achieving finality of
convictions. 65 It might also facilitate new defense pretrial motions such
as for summary judgment.
The Constitutional Justification of Broad Discovery
The President's Commission on Law Enforcment recommended
providing defense depositions in criminal cases. 66 On the other hand, the
American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Pretrial Proceed-
ings, while otherwise recommending broad criminal defense discovery,
has voted not to recommend a right to depositions in criminal cases but
to leave the question to the discretion of the trial court.' Apparently
this was a less than unanimous decision of the Committee, but no dis-
senting report was published. As its reasons, in addition to the cost to
the state, the Committee gave the following: (1) "the need to take
depositions might be construed as part of the adequacy of representation
required by the constitutional right to counsel"; 66 (2) "the imposition
on civilian witnesses may discourage their coming forward in criminal
'Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 105-06 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring); United States
v. Leichtfuss, 331 F. Supp. 723, 729 (N.D. II1. 1971); Brennan 282, 283 n.10, 287; Langrock, supra
note 51 at 733-34; Traynor, supra note 6, at 237; Young & Gray, Trial By Ambush-The Case
for Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Law, 25 Nev. St. B.J. 91, 95-96 (1960).
'
6 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 105 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Young & Gray,
supra note 162.
"'Brennan 283; Young & Gray, supra note 162, at 95.
"'ABA ADVISORY COMM., supra note 7, at 26-28.
UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 139 (1967). The Commission recommended expanded availability of
depositions for both sides, recognizing that the prosecution already has considerable deposition
rights through grand jury proceedings.




cases";' and (3) depositions will not be needed if there is otherwise
broad discovery. 170 None of these reasons is persuasive.
The reference to implicating the constitutional question of ade-
quate representation is puzzling. Surely the Committee was not suggest-
ing that it would be unfair to hold an attorney who was representing a
man charged with crime to the same standard of competency in connec-
tion with his pretrial preparation as his trial presentation; nor was it
indicating that the standard is so inflexible as not to allow an attorney,
in consultation with a client, to make an intelligent judgment that in a
particular case depositions are not needed. It would seem to be entirely
fair to hold that a defendant whose attorney deprived him of a defense
because he neglected pretrial depositions should be protected.
Discovery depositions would not impose on witnesses any more
than their testifying at a preliminary hearing or before a grand jury or
in civil pretrial depositions. A flexible deposition procedure could be
scheduled in consultation with the witnesses. Even granting that some
imposition would be involved, such a small inconvenience to a witness,
except in cases meriting a protective order, should not outweigh the
fundamental right of a defendant to gather the facts necessary to his
defense.
Finally, the Committee's argument that there is no need for crimi-
nal depositions is based on the assumption that "the prosecution will
ordinarily possess written statements or transcripts of testimony of po-
tential witnesses of such completeness that additional interrogation by
the defense attorney, prior to trial, will be of only marginal value in
most cases."' 7' Presumably, when the prosecutor does not have any
statements, the trial judge could, though he would not be required to,
order depositions.
The facile assumption in this argument is inconsistent with the
theory of the adversary system. We might as well ask defendants to rely
on the prosecutor to cross-examine his own witnesses at trial as assume
that the prosecutor will be sufficiently diligent in his interviews with
witnesses and thorough in his summary of them to protect the defen-
dant's interests as well as his own. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney
does not always interview his witnesses; often this is done only by inves-
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accumulation of evidence necessary to him on the diligence and thor-
oughness of any police officer who is responsible for a particular case
and who may or may not have adequate time to devote to any one case.
Some witnesses may be interviewed before the full scope of the facts has
become clear to the prosecuting authorities and thus before avenues of
inquiry have become known to them. In addition, whoever conducted
the interview for the government may not be privy to the defendant's
side of the story and thus may not be alert to seemingly unimportant
details that deserve to be explored.
Most of the states have unnecessarily limited a defendant's discov-
ery by a variety of doctrines that had their origins in the halting and
cautious growth of discovery. The most common of these doctrines
holds that the question of whether to grant discovery is in the discretion
of the trial court.1 2 A second limiting doctrine confines discovery to
evidence that would be admissible in court. 73 Another such doctrine
requires the defendant to establish a foundation for discovery by demon-
strating a particularized need for the information he requests. 174 Some
states surprisingly refuse discovery of evidence about which the defen-
dant already knows on the ground that he has no need of it. For exam-
ple, this rationale was invoked by Justice Musmanno, concurring in In
re DiJoseph,'175 to deny discovery of fingerprints on the alleged murder
weapon. Justice Musmanno puzzlingly reasoned that defendant "is one
person who knows whether she used the weapon or not and, therefore,
she is not being denied anything which she needs in the ascertainment
of truth."'176 The defendant's predicament in that case was that she
needed the fingerprints less to ascertain the truth for herself than to
demonstrate it to a jury if she were innocent. In addition, many states
deny discovery of particular categories of information-for example,
the defendant's confession, the confessions of co-defendants, the state-
"12E.g., In re DiJoseph, 394 Pa. 19, 22-23, 145 A.2d 187, 188 (1958) (C. Jones, C.J., concur-
ring); State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 103, 338 P.2d 319, 321 (1959).
13The doctrine derives from Chief Judge Cardozo's opinion in People ex rel. Lemon v.
Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 28-29, 156 N.E. 84, 85-86 (1927). New York has by statute elimi-
nated it. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 240.20 (McKinney 1971). See also, e.g., State ex reL Mahoney
v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74,78-79,275 P.2d 887,890 (1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-155.4 (Supp.
1971).
171E.g., United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Cobb,
271 F. Supp. 159, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. White, 15 Ohio St. 2d 146, 158, 239 N.E.2d 65,
74 (1968); State v. District Court, 135 Mont. 545, 551, 342 P.2d 1071, 1075 (1959); State v.
Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 552, 555-56, 559 (Fla. App. 1969).
175394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958).
1'6d. at 25, 145 A.2d at 189.
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ments of prospective witnesses, and the transcript or minutes of grand
jury testimony.
Discoverability should not be restricted to evidence that is admissi-
ble in court. Admissibility of evidence raises issues not pertinent to the
policy of discovery.' Even inadmissible evidence may have a variety of
uses in the preparation of a defense to criminal charges. Chief among
these is its use as a source of leads to admissible evidence. Also ranking
high in importance is its use as a background for cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses. As Justice Fortas has said, "No respectable in-
terest of the State is served by its concealment of information which is
material, generously conceived, to the case, including all possible defen-
ses."17
8
Nor should discoverability depend on the defendant's establishing
a foundation for it by demonstrating the importance to his case of the
information sought. Since the government has no cognizable interest in
withholding the evidence, such a requirement would impose difficult,
often insuperable, burdens on the defendant without thereby promoting
the legitimate ends of justice. There is no persuasive reason why he
should not be allowed to go on a "fishing expedition" for information
as long as he does not fish for the prosecution's work product. In many
cases the defendant-particularly if he is innocent-may have little or
no idea what information the prosecution might have. 79 Even if he is
able to specify some evidence that he would like to inspect, he may not
be able to predict the benefit that his inspection will produce. That is
precisely why he needs discovery. It is asking too much of a defendant,
and asking it unnecessarily, to require him, for example, to show what
inconsistencies might exist in a statement given to the police by a witness
as a condition to his obtaining discovery of the statement before he has
ever seen the statement and before the witness has testified. When this
foundation requirement is imposed, it may force defense attorneys to
speculate about their hopes or expectations regarding the information
sought. It is not surprising, therefore, that it "leads to .. . sterile,
unedifying, and unreal debates. ... "0 An additional reason why this
process may be prejudicial to a defendant is that in order to respond to
it his attorney may have to disclose his work product, his preliminary
'"Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 418 (1953). See also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66, 98, 100 (1966) (Fortas, J., concurring). -
"'8Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1966) (Fortas, J., concurring).
'17 Iraynor 230.
19'United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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or speculative information, his interpretation or evaluation of evidence
that he has, his planning of trial strategy, and, perhaps, even privileged
evidence s1 given to him by his client. At the same time, if the prosecu-
tion has information that in fact may aid the defendant, it is difficult to
see why its disclosure should depend upon whether the defendant al-
ready knows of its existence, can identify its sources, can appraise its
potential significance, or can otherwise blueprint its utility. For all of
these reasons, the defendant's requests for discovery "should prevail in
every case unless the Government shows some special and good reasons
why they should not."18 2
No exceptions to discoverability other than upon a showing of
particularized cause should be permitted with regard to the state-
ments-including statements given before a grand jury-given to the
government by any witnesses, including the defendant himself, any co-
defendant, and any prospective prosecution witness. These statements
are for the most part the product of prosecution discovery. If the defen-
dant's own statement is incriminating and was validly obtained, he will
likely learn its contents before he has to testify when it is introduced in
evidence as part of the prosecution's case.' Otherwise, he may still be
able to obtain advance discovery of it through a pretrial motion to
suppress it because it was given involuntarily' or during custodial inter-
rogation without the Miranda"s5 protections. In Britt v. North
Carolina8 1 the United States Supreme Court during the current term
held that by virtue of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment an indigent defendant is entitled to a free transcript of a
previous trial against him for his use at a retrial. The Court said that
even without allegations of specific need, "it can ordinarily be assumed
that a transcript of a prior mistrial would be valuable to the defendant
in at least two ways: as a discovery device in preparation for trial, and
as a tool at the trial itself for the impeachment of prosecution wit-
"'See discussion of prosecution discovery from the defendant in Part II.
"'United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855, 874 (1966).
1"3State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 137, 145 A.2d 313, 316 (1958).
""Presumably, even after Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), a coerced confession
would still be subject to suppression even against its use to impeach the testimony of the defendant
who gave it because of the danger of its untrustworthiness. Harris dealt only with a statement
obtained in violation of Miranda, but since the Court based its decision on unfairness in disarming
the prosecution of its defenses against a defendant's perjury, Harris casts some doubt over even
that coerced confession rule. See id. at 225 n.2.
"'See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"8'92 S. Ct. 431 (1971).
[Vol, 50
CRIMINAL DISCO VERY
nesses."'' 1 7 However, the Court went on to hold that on the specific facts
of the case before it and as defendant apparently conceded, defendant
had available an adequate alternative substantially equivalent to a tran-
script. For this finding, the Court relied on the facts that the two trials
were only a month apart; that the second trial was before the same judge
with the same defense attorney and court reporter; and that the trials
took place in a small town where the reporter was friendly with all the
local lawyers and "would at any time have read back to counsel his
notes of the mistrial, well in advance of the second trial, if counsel had
simply made an informal request."'"" In Harris v. New York' the
Supreme Court held the importance of prior statements of a witness in
such high regard that it ruled that the prosecution must be allowed to
use such statements in cross-examination of a defendant who testifies
in his own behalf, even if they were obtained in violation of the Miranda
rule and could not, therefore, have been used if the defendant had not
testified.
A special word should be said about the transcript or minutes of
grand jury testimony. Although the traditionally secret character of its
hearings and deliberations is an important attribute of the grand jury
proceeding while it is in session or with regard to persons whom it has
found insufficient cause to indict, there is no reason to keep the testi-
mony secret once a defendant has been indicted and received notice of
the indictment. The only reasons for grand jury secrecy are:
(I) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contem-
plated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliber-
ations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends
from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of per-
jury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand
jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encour-
age free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have informa-
tion with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent
accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been
"' d. at 434.
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the prosecution successfully impeached a defense
alibi witness with inconsistent statements the witness made in a pretrial interview with the prosecu-
tor. Pursuant to a discovery order, the defendant had given the name of the witness to the prosecu-
tor. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the discovery order. See discussion in Part
II.
' SBritt v. North Carolina, 92 S. Ct. 431, 434 (1971).
181401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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under investigation .... 190
None of these concerns obtain after the witnesses have testified, the
grand jury has deliberated, and the indictment has been publicized or
the defendant has been apprehended.19' "Witnesses before a grand jury
necessarily know that once called by the Government to testify at trial
they cannot remain secret informants quite apart from whether their
grand jury testimony is discoverable."'' 9 At this point the defendant's
strong interest in obtaining the means with which to absolve himself of
the charges or to minimize his culpability outweighs the vanished bases
for secrecy. The prosecutor has access to the testimony before the grand
jury and routinely uses it to prepare for trial, although the transcript or
the minutes do not belong to him any more than they do to the defen-
dant; rather, such minutes belong to the court.9 3 Therefore, the defen-
dant should be accorded the same privilege as that enjoyed by the
prosecution.
CONCLUSION ON DISCOVERY FOR THE DEFENSE
In view of recent expressions of opinion by the present members
of the Supreme Court, it may appear unlikely that the Court will soon
move as boldly in criminal discovery as this article has proposed. Jus-
tices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall seem strongly to support
Coleman and its impact on the constitutional law of discovery; Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, and probably also Justice
Rehnquist, appear to be strongly opposed; Justice Stewart appears to
have accepted it reluctantly and Justice Powell has yet to express his
opinion.'9 3. 1 Coleman, a threshhold decision to constitutional protec-
"'United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954). See also United States v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 & n.6 (1958); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395, 405 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 353, 345 P.2d 186,
187 (1959).
"'United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-34 (1940); United States v.
Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 668 n.3 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 629 (3d
Cir. 1954); State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 353, 345 P.2d 186, 187 (1959).
"'Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
"'United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1958) (Whitaker, J.,
concurring).
"'.Chief Justice Burger dissented from the basic holding in Coleman. Justice Blackmun did
not participate in Coleman but indicated in a concurring opinion in Adams v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct.
916, 921 (1972), that he felt Coleman was wrongly decided. Justice Stewart also dissented in
Coleman, arguing that because nothing that occurred at the preliminary hearing was used against
the defendant at trial, the defendant was not constitutionally prejudiced by the absence of counsel
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tion of broad discovery for defendants, will likely encourage further
development of discovery by the states. The Supreme Court should,
nevertheless, recognize the imperatives of the sixth amendment and of
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to satisfy
the constitutionally compelling needs of defendants for broad discovery
in the form of file disclosure and depositions.
II. DISCOVERY FOR THE PROSECUTION
The courts have long assumed that prosecution discovery is consti-
tutionally barred by the privilege against self-incrimination. 94 In Boyd
v. United States,"5 which was decided in 1886, the Supreme Court in
discussing the fourth and fifth amendments said: "[Any compulsory
discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of
his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his
property, is contrary to the principles of a free government."''
Recent judicial and legislative activity that supports some formal
discovery directly from the defendant to supplement the government's
considerable investigative discovery has challenged this doctrinal gener-
alization. Proposals for prosecutorial discovery that have been imple-
mented in some jurisdictions have employed three forms of limitation
operating singly or in combination in an effort to accommodate the fifth
amendment. These proposals would limit prosecution discovery to: (1)
cases in which the defendant has requested and received discovery; (2)
at the preliminary hearing. Unlike the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, however, Justice
Stewart joined the plurality opinion in Adams v. Illinois. The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun
filed separate concurring opinions to note their continuing disagreement with Coleman.
In Adams, the Supreme Court held that Coleman, unlike other right to-counsel cases, did
not apply prospectively. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Brennan, long an advocate
of broad criminal discovery. While reaffirming Coleman, Justice Brennan's opinion, in which
Justice Stewart joined, argued only that the right to counsel was not as important at the preliminary
hearing as at the trial so that on the question of retroactivity it was outweighed by the prior justified
reliance of the state on the lack of a requirement of counsel and the impact of retroactivity on the
administration of justice.
In Kirby v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1877 (1972), however, Justice Rehnquist, along with the Chief
Justice and Justice Blackmun, signed the plurality opinion written by Justice Stewart holding that
the right to counsel, in connection with lineups, does not attach until formal charges are filed. This
case has no direct bearing on criminal defense discovery, which will always follow the filing of
formal charges, but may demonstrate that Justice Rehnquist, along with the others with whom he
joined in the prevailing opinion, is reluctant to extend the right to counsel at all. Justice Powell
filed a one sentence concurring opinion that did not explain his views.
10'See cases cited note 3 supra.
19116 U.S. 616 (1886).
191Id. at 631-32.
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documentary and other physical evidence that the defendant intends to
produce at trial in support of his own case; or (3) evidence that the
defendant intends to produce at trial (including the names of witnesses)
in support of affirmative defenses. None provides for compelling the
defendant to disclose whether he will testify at trial or the testimony that
he would give, except insofar as the nature of his testimony might be
surmised from information supplied by witnesses or other evidence that
he is required to identify.197
Although the investigative resources at the command of the prose-
cution render discovery procedures for it less critical than for the defen-
dant, prosecution discovery could be as productive of fuller and fairer
factual presentations at trial as defense discovery. As in civil litigation,
the importance of reciprocal ascertainment of the facts argues convinc-
ingly for the broadest discovery opportunities for all parties in a crimi-
nal trial. Also as in civil litigation, however, each side may claim the
benefit of certain evidentiary privileges designed to protect other values
that would be jeopardized by unlimited discovery. For example, the
prosecutor may claim a privilege against disclosing his work product.,9 8
He may also claim a privilege to withhold from discovery the identity
of an informer who helped to supply probable cause for a search and
seizure as long as the informer is not also a material witness to the
defendant's guilt or innocence.199 Arguments for other prosecution privi-
leges which suggested that discovery would imperil the effectiveness of
law enforcement have been analyzed above and found wanting, except
insofar as they might justify a protective order when applied to a parti-
cular fact situation.
On the other hand, the defendant has the privilege against self-
incrimination and the attorney-client, doctor-patient, and husband-wife
privileges to assert against discovery. Among its other safeguards, the
fifth amendment privilege would probably protect a range of informa-
tion equivalent to that protected for the prosecutor by the work product
privilege. Concededly, that privilege alone spreads a wider insulatory
"'whenever a second trial of the same case is held, after a mistrial or appellate reversal of a
conviction, the prosecution has had discovery of the defense that the defendant presented at the
original trial, including any testimony that the defendant himself gave. In most cases, this defense
evidence will be the same at the retrial. The provision in the fifth amendment that no person shall
"be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" protects against
prosecutorial misuse of this procedure merely to achieve a more favorable result at the second trial.
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
'IsSee text following note 158 supra.
"See text accompanying note 159 supra.
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net than all of the privileges that the prosecutor might claim. Like other
evidentiary privileges, the privilege against self-incrimination is not a
friend of open inquiry. Its justification lies in a complex of values inde-
pendent of a search for facts.
The thesis of this Part is that prosecution discovery violates the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. To develop that
thesis, the relevant history and policies of the privilege against self-
incrimination will first be explored, and then the arguments advanced
to sustain the constitutionality of the three proposed forms of prosecu-
tion discovery will be discussed. Wherever defects in those arguments
are discovered, the question of whether they can be remedied short of a
complete denial of prosecutorial discovery will be considered. Finally,
the reasons why the arguments in support of the constitutionality of
prosecution discovery do not succeed will be explained.
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination is not only enduringly
carved into our fundamental Bill of Rights but is also crafted into the
fabric of political and religious contentions out of which our country and
our polity were woven. Its history is also the history of the Puritan
dissenters who, with others, settled our political framework of freedom.
Its emotional significance is coalesced into the basic American regard
for the privacy of the individual, particularly in his thoughts and in his
beliefs; for the limitation of substantive governmental power; and for
the importance of procedural regularity as a safeguard against abuse of
even legitimate governmental power. A creature of social ferment, the
privilege in all its varied functions serves as a standard against repres-
sion and against oppression. So well, in fact, has it served its several
offices that we easily and often become more conscious of its unavoida-
ble side effect as a shelter for the guilty than of its many benefits, some
of which are less immediate or more abstract.
Not accidentally, this most controversial of the provisions of our
Bill of Rights is also the provision with the most obscure background
in English and colonial history. It first found a place in a nation's
charter when our Bill of Rights borrowed it from the constitutions of
six of the colonies. It was not part of Magna Charta in 1215, and the
English Bill of Rights and Petition of Right-both of which were
drafted after the common law courts in England had recognized the
privilege as a rule of evidence-did not provide for it.'"'
"'Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91-92 (1908); C. MCCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE
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Elizabeth and Whitgift were the villainous names in the history of
the privilege; "Free Born"2'' John Lilburn was the folk hero; and Sir
Edward Coke was the legal champion. Parliament, and particularly the
House of Commons, vying with the Crown to establish political prerog-
atives, played a key role as an antagonist of the establishment institu-
tions-the Court of Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission.
Before Elizabeth's ascent to the throne, England's judicial responsi-
bility had been divided between the common law courts, presided over
by lay judges, and the ecclesiastical courts, presided over by bishops.
During this period jurisdictional disputes between regal power and papal
power were not uncommon.202 By the statute De Articulis Cleri in the
early fourteenth century, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts over
laymen was limited to matrimonial and testamentary matters °.20  Ex-
cept for about seven years under Edward VI, the church also had the
power to punish for heresy.2 4
After the demise of the ecclesiastical trials by ordeal or by compur-
gation oath, the church courts instituted a new procedure by which they
questioned the accused as to the facts underlying the charge upon his
oath to give truthful answers.2 5 Wigmore has called this oath "inquisi-
tional" by contrast with the compurgation oath.20 1
Now that the ecclesiastical courts could obtain information directly
from the accused, an important distinction arose based upon the "prob-
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 120, at 255 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCoRMICK]; S. HOOK, COMMON
SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 24 (1957); Baker, Self-Incrimination: Is the Privilege an
Anachronism? 42 A.B.A.J. 633 (1956); Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 764 (1935) [hereinafter cited
as Pittman]; Williams, Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FOPDHAM L. REV. 19, 20 (1955).
2°Trial of Lieutenant-Colonal John Lilburne for High Treason, 4 Howell's State Trials 1269,
1270 n.' (1649): "Lilburne, it seems, had obtained the appellation of 'Free Born John.'" Lilburn
himself spelled his name without an "e." See Trial of John Lilburn & John Wharton, for Printing
and Publishing Seditious Books, 3 Howell's State Trials 1315 (1637).
2018 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 270 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE];
Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
10 VAND. L. REV. 485, 486 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Weintraub].
205 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 251 (1827) [hereinafter cited as BENTHAM];
8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 271; Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25
CLEV. B.A.J. 91 (1954).
2"MCCORMICK § 120, at 253; 8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 277; Moreland, Historical Background
and Implications of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 44 Ky. L.J. 267, 269 (1956); Morgan,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Morgan].
2MCCORMICK § 120, at 252; 8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 273-74; Weintraub 486.
2'8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 273.
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able cause" that had to exist before an accused could be compelled to
take the oath.2 17 When a party was put to an oath merely by virtue of
the official authority of the judge-without justified suspicion of guilt
such as that supplied by accusing witnesses or even common report or
notorious suspicion-in the hope of extracting a confession, the oath
was called an "oath ex officio. 2 8
The earliest inquiries under oath met with authoritative opposition
based upon the forced subjection to inquisitional procedures. In the
thirteenth century these oaths were conducted by Grosseteste, Bishop of
London, "into the conduct and morals of both great and humble in his
diocese, thereby causing serious injury to the reputation of many."20
They were successfully opposed by the King and Parliament.2 10 In the
fourteenth century the inquiries were conducted by the King's Council
in criminal cases.211 These were also successfully protested by Parlia-
ment.212
During Elizabeth's reign she tried to control the spiritual as well
as the political leadership of England. Puritan attacks on the Anglican
church created great religious divisions in her clergy.2 13 The Queen
regarded these attacks as attacks on her royal supremacy and demanded
Anglican conformity. 24 "The very structure of the Tudor state implied
a control of the national church, and basically a denial of the Queen's
religious authority implied disobedience, indeed, even treason. No mat-
ter how much the Puritans protested their loyalty, their actions contra-
dicted their words. 2 15
The House of Commons was sympathetic with the Puritans. 216 Lord
Coke shared this sympathy.2t 7 During this important time he was
speaker of the Commons, before becoming Chief Justice of the Court
of Common Pleas and later of the King's Bench. At the same time, the
Commons resented the imposition on their prerogatives of the Queen's
... MCCORMCK 253; 8 WXIGNIORE § 2250, at 275; Weintraub 486-87.
208 WIGNORE § 2250, at 275-76; Kemp, The Background of the Fifth Amendment in English
Law: A Study of its Historical Implications, I WM. & MARY L. REV. 247, 249 n.5 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Kemp]; Morgan 1; Weintraub 487.
2'Morgan 2.
"'





2"Id. at 254-55, 257.
21Id. at 256.
111Id. at 265.
2178 WIGMORE § 2250, at 280; Kemp 274-76, 278.
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refusal to allow them any discussion of the religious question. The pe-
riod was one of constant unrest.
Queen Elizabeth activated the royal prerogative Court of Star
Chamber to protect her political flank.218 An offshoot of the Privy
Council, Star Chamber had first been sanctioned by statute as early as
1487. Since it was a law court with broad statutory powers, including
the use of the oath ex officio, and with a fluctuating membership that
usually included the Chancellor and the two Chief Justices, it functioned
for a long period of time without considerable criticism.219
To protect her religious flank, Elizabeth established the Court of
High Commission, vested in it the ecclesiastical authority over heretics,
and constituted it as a court with power to impose sentences of fine,
imprisonment, and even death. 220 Like Star Chamber, this extraordinary
court employed the oath ex officio. 22'
Until the appointment of Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, as
its sixth Commissioner, the Court of High Commission had been lenient
with the Puritans. 22 Whitgift, however, "became Elizabeth's trump card
in her drive for religious conformity. ' ' 221 Wigmore described Whitgift
as "a man of stern Christian zeal, determined to crush heresy wherever
its head was raised. He proceeded immediately to examine clergymen
and other suspected persons, upon oath, after the extremest 'ex officio'
style.' 24 Kemp described the use of the oath as follows: "Even where
there was but a wisp of suspicion, men were cited before the commission
and forced under oath to answer to their religious convictions and their
conventicle activities. ' 225 Wigmore concluded that the oath ex officio
degenerated "into a merely unlawful process of poking about in the
speculation of finding something chargeable. '226
As the chief victims of the proceeding, the Puritans focused an
attack on the oath ex officio.227 In response to criticism from them and
their supporters, as well as from Parliament, which drew up a series of
complaints against Whitgift's Commission, and from the common law
'VWeintraub 487.
2195 BENTHAM 254; 8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 278-79 & n.43; Kemp 251-52.




2218 WIGMORE § 2250, at 279. See also Kemp 262-63, 268 n.70.
22 Kemp 263.
2268 WIGNIORE § 2250, at 276.
2'Kemp 263; Pittman 763, 773.
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judges, who saw the High Commission impinging on their prerogatives,
"Whitgift and the bishops. . . declared that if there were no oath they
could not protect the establishment, for how else could they get informa-
tion about ministers and parishes secretly going Puritan .... ",21
The Puritans argued against the oath largely on the basis of free-
dom of conscience.2 9 Legal arguments raised against the oath dealt in
the main, however, not with a direct attack against it, but rather with
the authority of the Crown and its prerogative courts to use it.230 Coke's
position was that the oath was legal only for the civil courts adminis-
tered by Parliament, at least insofar as it was used in penal rather than
matrimonial or testamentary causes.nI He praised the Star Chamber
even though it, too, used the oath ex officio.232
The scope of concerns responsible for the disrepute ultimately at-
taching to the oath ex officio, as well as the Star Chamber and High
Commission themselves, is enmeshed in the revolutionary situation of
the time. As a result, the reasons for their elimination are not clear.
Although earlier the common law courts refused to interfere with the
use of the oath ex officio, they later employed Coke's argument-that
an ecclesiastical commission had no power to imprison-to justify use
of the writ of habeas corpus to free men imprisoned by the High
Commission.231
After James and then Charles had succeeded Elizabeth, the Court
of High Commission, which had absorbed the greatest public condem-
nation for use of the oath ex officio, was abolished by statute in 1641. 23
Another statute was also enacted then to prohibit the administration ex
officio of a self-incriminating oath by any ecclesiastical authority.25 At
the same time the Star Chamber was abolished,26 but the continuing
controversy of a case that had been before it created the impetus for a
general privilege against self-incrimination. Although many Puritans
befor& John Lilburn-including Thomas Cartwright, the "Patriarch of
the Puritans"-had refused to take the oath and been punished, 237 the
n'Kemp 265.
221d. at 269-70, 280-81.
moId at 280-81.
"'Id. at 276-77.
='Id. at 280-81 & n.117.
"'8 WIG1MORE § 2250, at 280-81; Kemp 275-76; Morgan 7.
2"MCCORMICK § 120, at 254; 8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 283.
2"McCoRRMICK § 120, at 254; 8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 283-84 & n.69.
2"MCCORMICK § 120, at 254; 8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 283.
2"Kemp 264-65, 268-69.
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timing and tenacity of Lilburn's pursuit of exoneration gave his case
notoriety throughout London and all of England and a special historical
significance."'
In 1637 at the age of twenty Lilburn was charged before the Star
Chamber with sedition for printing and importing into England from
Holland writings against the bishops.2?9 Lilburn freely answered ques-
tions about his period of residence in Holland and his acquaintanceship
there with certain people.240 He also denied having sent any books into
England. 241 Nevertheless, he balked at taking the oath to "make true
'answer to all things that are asked you.' "22 He explained his position
to the Court as follows:
I refused upon this ground, because that when I was examined, though
I had fully answered all things that belonged to me to answer unto,
and had cleared myself of the thing for which I am imprisoned, which
was for sending Books out of Holland, yet that would not satisfy and
give content, but other things were put unto me, concerning other men,
to insnare me, and get further matter against me; which I perceiving
refused, being not bound to answer to such things as do not belong
unto me.24
3
Lilburn also compared the oath to the "High Commission Oath,
which Oath I know to be both against the law of God, and the law of
the land.' '"2  Specifically invoking a privilege against self-incrimination,
he told the Court: "I am unwilling to answer to any impertinent ques-
tions, for fear that with my answer I may do myself hurt."'1 5
Unimpressed, the Court sentenced Lilburn to be whipped pub-
licly.246 After the sentence was executed, he was put on the pillory for
the rest of the day.247 He told the tip-staff of the Star Chamber: "Paul
found more mercy from the heathen Roman Governors, for they would
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966); E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
TODAY 3 (1955) [hereinafter cited as GRISWOLD]; 8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 282-83; Kemp 283;
Morgan 9-10; Pittman 770.
rTrial of John Lilburn & John Wharton, for Printing and Publishing Seditious Books, 3
Howell's State Trials 1315 (1637).
24Id. at 1317-18.2
'
11d. at 1317-18, 1321, 1324-25.
211d. at 1317-18; see id. at 1325-26.
21Id. at 1321.
2411d. at 1323; see id. at 1325. See also id. at 1321.
2411d. at 1318.




not put him to an oath to accuse himself .... ,,2"1 At the pillory he
sermonized at length against the Papist English ChurchY.2 9 For that the
Star Chamber ordered him imprisoned.21
On November 3, 1640,51 Parliament met for the first time in eleven
years. On that day Lilburn presented a petition to Parliament, which
immediately ordered him set free. 2 The House of Commons followed
this action with a resolution on May 4, 1641 that Lilburn's sentence was
"'illegal, and against the Liberty of the subject; and also bloody, cruel,
wicked, barbarous, and tyrannical.' "2 It further resolved that repara-
tion be paid to Lilburn and that the case be transmitted to the House
of Lords.24 No specific legal basis for the resolution was noted.
It was not until four years later that the Commons, involved with
other business, upon a new petition from Lilburn transmitted its resolu-
tion to the House of Lords.215 The Lords scheduled a hearing, at which
Lilburn's attorney argued that the sentence was illegal because it was
"contrary to the laws of God, nature, and the kingdom, for any man to
be his own accuser." 6 The Lords vacated Lilburn's sentence "'as ille-
gal, and most unjust, against the liberty of the subject, and law of the
land, and Magna Charta' ,,217 and later awarded him reparations, which
he had little success in collecting."'
Although the crisis over the oath ex officio may have been inevita-
ble in the revolutionary circumstances that existed in England at the
time, 59 it was in the aftermath of Lilburn's case that the privilege
against self-incrimination achieved growing acceptance. By the end of
the seventeenth century, "professional opinion apparently settled
against the exaction of an answer under any form of procedure, in












m Id. at 1359-68.
2'Kemp 284.
2118 WIGMORE § 2250 at 284. See also Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955);
McCoRMICK § 120, at 255; Kemp 285; McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 138, 149 (1960); Morgan 9, 10-11; Pittman 774.
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During this same period the privilege against self-incrimination
won widespread acceptance in our colonies.2"' The notable exception"'
was in the Royal Courts of the Governor and Council,2 3 whose "pro-
ceedings were very, inquisitional and ofttimes overbearing. ' 264 On June
12, 1776, Virginia adopted the Bills of Right drafted by George
Mason.265 Section eight provided among other procedural rights in capi-
tal or criminal prosecutions the right of a man not to "'be compelled
to give evidence against himself.' "266 North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont adopted the Virginia language.2 7 Maryland did too but added
a power in the legislature to modify it.211 Massachusetts and New
Hampshire adopted the following format: "'No subject shall be...
compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself.' "269 In the fifth
amendment z 0 the equivalent provision reads as follows: "No person
• ..shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."
Policies of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In seventeenth century England the most cogent legal argument
available to nullify the oath ex officio-no fifth amendment equivalent
then existing-was Coke's argument that it was being exercised beyond
the powers of the Court of High Commission because the jurisdiction
of that tribunal was limited to matrimonial and testamentary affairs and
did not include inquiries into heresy. However, it would be a mistake
to think that such was the full extent of the dissatisfaction with the
oath.Y' That argument was not so effective against the Star Chamber,
2"MCCORMICK § 120, at 255; 8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 293-95; Morgan 19; Pittman 775-81.
nrrhe privilege against self-incrimination was also not recognized in the Salem witch trials of
the 1690's. "Many of the accused persons claimed their privilege not to accuse themselves but every





267GRISWOLD 6; Morgan 22 & n.86; Pittman 788.
2"Pittman 788.
nWId.
27'The fifth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3, 6 (1964).
"18 WIGMORE § 2250, at 271, 289; Morgan 5; see Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Cm. L. REV. 687, 694 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as Meltzer].
2728 WIGMORE § 2250, at 281.
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and it was in that infamous political court that the oath ex officio met
its match in John Lilburn. In evaluating the odium for the oath, we must
look not only to the relative technicality urged by Coke and the jealousy
that motivated Parliament but also to the views of its F'uritan victims,
whose contribution to the struggle against the oath and the extraordi-
nary courts that took advantage of it was crucial to the victory?
3
Moreover, the relatively routine way in which the privilege against self-
incrimination became a part of the law of the common law courts soon
after the demise of Star Chamber and High Commission evidences a
broader concern with the evils of the oath ex officio than merely its ultra
vires exercise.274
No doubt, there was some confusion between the attack on the power
of the spiritual courts even to entertain certain causes and its power
to institute proceedings by the ex officio oath. But there can equally
be no doubt that to the common lawyers a system which required a
person to furnish his own indictment from his own lips under oath was
repugnant to the law of the land? 5
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is certainly
not confined by its history. "[I]t is as broad as the mischief against
which it seeks to guard.1121 Since the privilege represents a complex of
"
3Kemp 266-67.
21"The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon
no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a
popular demand." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896); cf 5 BENTHAM 241-44; 8 WIGMORE
§ 2250, at 291-92.
Bentham explained the development of the privilege in the common law courts as follows:
In a state of things like this, what could be more natural than that, by a people infants
as yet in reason, giants in passion, every distinguishable feature of a system of procedure
directed to such ends should be condemned in the lump, should be involved in one
undistinguishing mass of odium and abhorrence; more especially any particular instru-
ment or feature, from which the system was seen to operate with a particular degree of
efficiency towards such abominable ends? If, then, in the ordinary courts of law, the
practice with respect to the admission of this sort of information was wavering, or the
opinion of the profession hesitating, nothing could be more natural than that the obser-
vation of the enormous mass of mischief and oppression to which it was continually
made subservient, should turn the scale.
5 BENTHAI, 244.
Bentham characterized that development as follows: "Whatever Titius did was wrong: but this
is among the things that Titius did; therefore this is wrong: such is the logic from which this
sophism is deduced." Id. at 241.
2"Morgan 9.
"'Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 459 (1966).
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fundamental values, analysis of its applicability to a particular situation
is incomplete if it isolates one or more such values and studies the extent
to which they are furthered in that context."' Its narrow and its broad
objectives must be given wide berth since "illegitimate and unconstitu-
tional practices get their first footing . ..by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure." 5 Its effectiveness
depends on its enforcement not only by the United States Supreme
Court, which might be able to draw fine distinctions based on variations
in fact patterns developed before it, but also by the full panoply of
judicial, legislative, administrative, and police caretakers dispersed
throughout the country, each with more or less of a discerning eye for
the subtleties of careful distinctions and more or less of a sensitivity to
the broadly conceived values underlying the privilege.
The Interrogation Policy. The historical development of the privi-
lege holds a special lesson for prosecution discovery. The more that the
oath ex officio was relied upon for discovery of incriminating informa-
tion-that is, the less evidence the inquiring tribunal had independently
gathered against the accused-the greater was the resentment that it
deserved. Thus, the fifth amendment serves no greater value than when
it operates in the investigatory or discovery stage of a criminal trial.
With the increasing sophistication of the privilege against self-
incrimination in our criminal procedure, its importance as "a barrier to
the 'drag-net' philosophy of law enforcement" 9 has only increased.
One danger in criminal discovery by the prosecution is that the
government would be thereby equipped to interrogate citizens about
their activities more or less at will. "We want no official issuing 'show
cause' orders forcing citizens to justify themselves or go to jail."8 0 The
t nMurphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 56 n.5 (1964); 8 WIGMORE § 2251, at 296.
2"Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
27Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor Confronts the
Dilemma, 53 CAL. L. REV. 89, 98 (1965).
mid. On two counts this constitutional concern is not inconsistent with the view that the
prosecution may raise no cognizable objection to a defense fishing expedition through its files.
First, no policy equivalent to the privilege against self-incrimination protects prosecutorial privacy.
Second, the defendant's position in a criminal case differs from that of the prosecution in that he
has not initiated the action. Since the defendant is the involuntary focus of the proceeding, the
legitimacy of his interest in the relevant files of the prosecutor is manifest. He is not searching at
random for information in order to harass or embarrass the government. By bringing its prosecu-
torial forces to bear on the defendant, the government, on the other hand, necessarily concedes
the propriety of his interest in its files. When the government is doing the fishing, it is not
responding to a charge of the defendant. It has unilaterally determined that it has an interest in
information in the possession of the defendant.
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fifth amendment applies before trial both to procedures that ordinarily
precede a criminal trial-such as police investigations, 28' grand jury
proceedings, and preliminary hearings2 2-and to procedures that are
not ordinarily associated with criminal trials but may supply evidence
for use in such trials if incriminating testimony is elicited during their
course-such as legislative2 11 or administrative2 4 hearings or civil
trials. 25 It is important that it also apply to discovery.
A requirement that the prosecution establish probable cause to
believe that the defendant committed a crime and a limitation on discov-
ery to information regarding that suspected crime would narrow the
scope of the government's investigation. It would not, however, preclude
a general search for evidence. The formulas for probable cause afford
no assurance that without the privilege against self-incrimination the
government would curtail its employment of discovery to those cases in
which it already had substantial evidence; these are the cases in which,
by hypothesis, the government stands least in need of discovery, except
arguably for information about affirmative defenses. "History teaches
that too ready availability of the accused as the source of the evidence
against him inevitably tempts the state to intrude too much. 2 6
We are far from free of such temptations in our criminal as well
as in our legislative 287 or administrative 288 inquiries. Combatting police
custodial interrogation techniques that involve psychological as well as
physical coercion has been an important business of our courts, culmi-
nating in Miranda v. Arizona2s' in the application of the fifth amend-
ment prophylactic. Informers to report or ferret out evidence of crimes,
often crimes not yet committed or perhaps not even contemplated upon
dispatch of the informers, are employed by law enforcement agencies
'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"'E.g., Stevens v. Mark, 383 U.S. 234 (1966).
tmSlochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
2s'E.g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
-8 WIGMORE §§ 2268-69, at 402-05, 411-13.
2"Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1197.
"-See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479 (1951).
"'Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1946); Boudin, The Constitutional Privilege in Operation, 12 LAW. GUILD Rav. 128,
129, 149 (1952); Fortas, supra note 203, at 101.
"'384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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without meeting any preliminary conditions-not even the minimal re-
quirement of probable cause .29  Despite the fifth amendment protections
afforded to criminal suspects in announced police investigations, 29' no
opportunity to claim the privilege against self-incrimination is given to
the subjects of undercover surveillance. 92
The grand jury, guided by the government's prosecutor, necessarily
undertakes its investigations without first satisfying itself or any judicial
tribunal that there is cause to do so. When the grand jury is inquiring
into the improprieties of its witnesses themselves, it is employing a form
of the oath ex officio. Such witnesses are guaranteed the privilege
against self-incrimination, which they can exercise if they are aware that
the grand jury is probing their activities or are reasonably concerned
that it might be. The grand jury proceeding is conducted in the absence
of any judge, however, and the closest that the witness may have his
attorney is outside the door to the grand jury chamber. In order to
secure the advice of counsel concerning the potentially incriminating
character of questions propounded to him, the witness must regularly
report secondhand the proceedings tQ the attorney.
The "First Amendment" Policy. Another important impression
from the historical development of the privilege against self-
incrimination must be of the close connection between the original need
for the privilege and the struggle for political and religious freedom.
Although the first amendment supplies most of our protection for free-
dom of conscience, it is complemented by the fifth amendment.9 ' The
first amendment does not purport to prohibit all inquiry into beliefs.
"There is no solid tradition of official self-restraint in the 'anti-belief'
area and no established privilege not to disclose matters related closely
to religious, political and moral beliefs and activities."294 Nor does the
fifth amendment block all inquiry into belief. It bars such inquiry only
when it would have a tendency to elicit incriminating responses. 29
Although the privilege against self-incrimination applies to crimi-
"'United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Bentham believed that the privilege against self-incrimination was responsible for the law-
enforcement need for informers. 5 BIENTHAM 219-20.
"'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"'See cases cited note 290 supra. But cf. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
"38 WIGMORE § 2251, at 313-14; Friendly, The Fifih Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CINN. L. REv. 671, 696 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Friendly];
McKay, Book Review, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1097, 1100-01 (1960); McNaughton 149 n.50.
248 WIGMORE § 2251, at 314. See also Boudin, supra note 288, at 149.
2
'sJudge Friendly has written: "The trouble in this area is not that the privilege is too broad
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nal cases generally, it is most useful in the category of criminal cases
that involve inquiry into speech, religion, and association. As Dean, now
Solicitor General, Griswold has written,
Where matters of a man's belief or opinions or political views are
essential elements in the charge, it may be most difficult to get evi-
dence from sources other than the suspected or accused person himself.
Hence, the significance of the privilege over the years has perhaps been
greatest in connection with resistance to prosecution for such offenses
as heresy or political crimes. 96
The Privacy Policy. Like the fourth amendment and other provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights," 7 the fifth amendment also provides impor-
tant protection for the privacy of the individual and thus helps to deline-
ate "the proper scope of governmental power over the citizen." ' In
Griswold v. Connecticut l99 the Supreme Court said: "The lFifth Amend-
ment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone
of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment." Judge Frank has said that the privilege against self-
incrimination affords an individual a substantive "right to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of
our democracy." 30 After quoting that language and confirming its
concept, the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona30 1 said:
All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitu-
tional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a govern-
ment-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the
government "to shoulder the entire load," . . to respect the inviola-
bility of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal
justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual
but that it is not broad enough. Why should resistance to governmental prying into a man's
ideological views require him to make a claim, often farfetched and possibly beyond what he can
conscientiously do, that an answer would tend to incriminate him?" Friendly 696.
M
9 GRISWOLD 8-9. See also Boudin, supra note 288, at 128-29.
2"See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965).
2 9Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 260-61 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring and dissenting).
n'381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
ImUnited States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 566, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion), rev'd,
353 U.S. 391 (1957). See also Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); 8 WIGMORE § 2251, at 317; Fortas 97-98; McKay, Self-
Incirmination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 210-14; Louisell, supra note 279, at
95.
3,1384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
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produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather
than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own
mouth. . . . In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is
guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in
the unfettered exercise of his own will."
Other purposes of the privilege3 2 are less relevant in discovery
than in other contexts and need not be discussed here. Since discovery
would be accomplished through formal procedures, there should be no
concern, for example, about torture, overbearing, or bullying, against
which the fifth amendment protects.313
Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Because subject to judicial supervision, the developments in prose-
'0See generally Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); 8 WIGMORE § 2251.
-See 8 WIGMORE § 2251, at 315-16. If prosecution discovery is constitutional, it can be
enforced by allowing comment to the jury on a defendant's failure to comply with a proper order.
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 539, 421 P.2d 393,
399, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 391 (1966); Meltzer, supra note 271, at 692. In addition, the defendant or
his attorney might be punished for contempt. See In re Marcario, 2 Cal. 3d 329, 466 P.2d 679, 85
Cal. Rptr. 135 (1970); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 493,-., 88 Cal. Rptr. 154,
157 (1970). Other remedies for noncompliance, such as precluding the defendant from raising a
defense or from utilizing at trial nondisclosed evidence, raise additional constitutional problems.
See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 206 n.36 (1946), discussing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886): "The vitiating element [in Boyd] lay in the incriminating
character of the unusual provision for enforcement. The statute provided that failure to produce
might be taken as a confession of whatever might be alleged in the motion for production." The
statute permitted the prosecuting attorney to argue that had the document been produced it would
have provided what he claimed it would. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1886).
The remedy provided by the Florida statute was that any evidence other than defendant's own
testimony offered to prove the alibi could be excluded. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80, 104-
05 (1970). In Williams the defendant did make disclosure so the question of a penalty for his failing
to do so did not arise. Id. at 83 n.14.
See also State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968). In that case
even the defendant was not allowed to testify regarding his alibi defense for failure to give pretrial
notice of his intention to do so.
Rule 16(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure makes the following provision for
violation of a discovery order by either the prosecutor or the defendant:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant
to this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection of
materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from
introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as
it deems just under the circumstances.
It would be hard to accept a concept by which an innocent man might be convicted of a serious
crime only because a less serious refusal to comply with a procedural order barred proof of his
defense, at least where alternatives for enforcement of the order were available.
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cutorial discovery differ markedly from such procedures as custodial
interrogation. Although nothing in fifth amendment analysis turns on
the presence of such supervision and although a judge no more than a
police officer, a grand juror, a legislator, or an administrative officer
may compel a defendant to incriminate himself, judicial supervision
may be an important factor because the distinctions drawn by the sug-
gested provisions for discovery from the defendant, if they succeed in
avoiding conflict with the fifth amendment at all, may require judicial
determination of close questions. The trend toward such prosecutorial
discovery has just survived its first scrutiny by the United States Su-
preme Court in Williams v. Florida3 °4 and that success is sure to spur
increasing interest by the states in provisions for discovery from the
defendant." 5
Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a
model36 for broad prosecutorial discovery.3 7 In an attempt to prevent
overreaching of the prosecution discovery into the realm protected by
the privilege against self-incrimination, rule 16(c) invests prosecutorial
discovery with a reciprocal or conditional character by making it avail-
able only when the defendant himself successfully seeks discovery.
3 18
-1399 U.S. 78 (1970).
=The American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Pretrial Proceedings originally
rejected prosecution discovery for non-constitutional reasons; after the decision in Williams, it
changed its position. ABA ADVISORY CoMNI. 3-6 (Supp. Oct. 1970).
"'Some of the states have already followed the federal model. E.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. (CRIM.)
R. 16(c); FLA. R. CRINI. P. 1.220(c).
MFED. R. CRINI. P. 16(a)(2), (b) provide for defense discovery of the results or reports of
physical or mental examinations or scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the case
and other material books, papers, documents, or tangible objects, buildings, or places. Paragraphs
(a)(1) and (3) of rule 16 provide for defense discovery of defendant's statements, including his
recorded testimony before a grand jury.
=FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c) provides as follows:
If the court grants relief sought by the defendant under subdivision (a)(2) or subdivi-
sion (b) of this rule, it may, upon motion of the government, condition its order by
requiring that the defendant permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph
scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents, tangible objects, or copies or
portions thereof, which the defendant intends to produce at the trial and which are within
his possession, custody or control, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of
the government's case and that the request is reasonable. Except as to scientific or
medical reports, this subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of re-
ports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant, or his
attorney or agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or of
statements made by the defendant, or by government or defense witnesses, or by pro-
spective government or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his agents or attorneys.
In dissenting statements to the transmittal of the amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal
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The reciprocity does not, however, limit prosecution discovery to the
subject matter of the defense discovery. The rule also limits the thrust
of a discovery order to documentary and other physical evidence that
the defendant intends to produce at the trial. In addition, the rule au-
thorizes discovery only when the prosecution's request is reasonable and
for material information. It does not provide for discovery of the names
of witnesses other than those revealed in the discoverable evidence and
specifically excludes from discovery witnesses' statements and the de-
fense attorney's work product.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet passed upon the constitu-
tionality of rule 16(c), its recent decision in Williams v. Florida"9 offers
guidance in resolving the questions of whether prosecutorial discovery
can be fashioned to avoid conflict with the fifth amendment and whether
rule 16(c) has done so. In Williams the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of a Florida law requiring "a defendant, on written
demand of the prosecuting attorney, to give notice in advance of trial if
the defendant intends to claim an alibi, and to furnish the prosecuting
attorney with information as to the place he claims to have been and
with the names and addresses of the alibi witnesses he intends to
use."3t ° The reasoning that the Court used to uphold this statute against
a fifth amendment challenge followed closely that employed by Chief
Justice Traynor for the California Supreme Court in Jones v. Superior
CourtY.31 Jones dealt with an impotency defense to a rape charge rather
than an alibi defense. It arose after the defendant had disclosed his
intent to rely on impotency as a defense in a motion for a continuance
to gather necessary medical evidence. The Jones discovery order was
limited to the identities, reports, and Xrays of doctors. In all other
factual respects, Williams and Jones are identical.3 12
Procedure that included this rule 16(c), Justices Black and Douglas said that the rule raises a
serious question under the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Amendments to
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 272, 276, 278 (1966). Justice Douglas pointed out
that the rule was approved by a narrow majority. Id. at 279.
A proposed amendment to rule 16 suggests eliminating the conditional character of prosecu-
tion discovery and providing a right to such discovery independent of any request for discovery by
the defendant. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 547, 591, 596 (1970).
-399 U.S. 78 (1970).
310399 U.S. at 79 (footnote omitted).
3158 Cal. 26 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
1121n Williams the discovery order was based on a statute; in Jones it was not. The dissenting
justices in Jones argued that prosecution discovery should at least await legislative action, but they
did not suggest that this factor was of fifth amendment significance. Id. at 68-69, 372 P.2d at 926-
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Both cases involved discovery orders that were narrower in one
respect and broader in another than those permitted by rule 16(c). They
were narrower in that each limited the required production to evidence
relating to one particular defense. They were broader in that both in-
cluded the identity of witnesses within their scope. Whether those differ-
ences are material should appear from an examination of the reasoning
in favor of the constitutionality of the Williams and Jones discovery
orders.
The Jones rationale emphasized two factors in the case: first, that
defendant was required to disclose only information relating to an af-
firmative defense; second, that defendant was required to disclose only
information that he intended to produce at trial anyway. In consequence
of both of these factors, the court reasoned that the discovery order did
not compel defendant to disclose anything; it merely regulated the tim-
ing of a disclosure that he was already planning to make by accelerating
it from the time he would be called upon to present his defense at trial
to the pre-trial stage. As Chief Justice Traynor later explained, "Neither
the privilege against self-incrimination nor the due process requirements
of a fair trial fix the time when the prosecution has presented its evi-
dence at the trial as the only procedural hour at which the defendant
can be required to make his decision whether to remain silent or present
his defense. ' '13
The significance of the fact that only an affirmative defense is
involved would seem to be that by disclosing information material only
to such a defense, presumably the defendant does not risk supplying
evidence useful to the prosecutor in the presentation of his case-in-chief.
Thus, the value of the disclosure to the prosecutor is not that it enables
him to build his case against the defendant but only that it enables him
to prepare to meet defenses that the defendant has the responsibility to
raise. In this context, an affirmative defense3l4 should be defined in
terms of two considerations extrapolated from these cases: first, it
should be a defense in which the burden of going forward with the
evidence is on the defendant; secondly, it should be a defense that estab-
27, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87. One of the dissenters, Justice Peters, also disagreed with the majority
that there was not a fifth amendment violation in the order. Id. at 62-68, 372 P.2d at 922-26, 22
Cal. Rptr. at 882-86.
3Traynor, supra note 6, at 248.
314The Williams opinion did not talk in terms of affirmative defenses, though it did involve
one that meets the definition in the text. The Jones opinion did use that language. 58 Cal. 2d at
61, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882. It is helpful to begin a discussion of both of those cases
with an assumption that only affirmative defenses are involved.
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lishes facts other than those occurring at the time and place of the crime
to affect inferentially the determination of what did then and there take
place. The impotency and alibi defenses qualify under both aspects of
this definition. In order to survive a defense motion for judgment of
acquittal, the prosecutor need not prove that the defendant was sexually
competent or that he was not every place else in the world except the
crime scene at the time of the crime. For the purposes of his case-in-
chief, he amply establishes the related elements of the offense if he
presents the victim's testimony that she was raped, in Jones, or eyewit-
ness or other evidence placing the defendant at the scene of the crime,
in Williams. His initial presentation is not significantly enhanced by
additional evidence that the defendant was not impotent or that he was
not at home, not at Barney's saloon, or not any place other than the
crime scene.
If this is true, then as long as the defendant is required to disclose
only evidence that he intends to produce at trial himself, Williams and
Jones argue that the discovery order does not require him to supply the
prosecution evidence tending itself to establish some element of defen-
dant's guilt or to furnish leads to such evidence. Under this analysis the
discovery order does compel the defendant to incriminate himself in the
broad sense of helping the prosecution to convict him. It does not,
however, compel him to incriminate himself in the direct sense of accus-
ing or serving as the source of the evidence against himself. Whatever
self-incrimination might inhere in the assistance supplied the prosecu-
tor's preparation is no different from what is routinely available to the
prosecutor through a combination of the defendant presenting his evi-
dence in defense at trial and the court at that time granting a
prosecution motion for a continuance to prepare its rebuttal. No viola-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination is therefore involved;
instead, there is only a procedural adjustment to avoid delay in the trial
that in no way impairs or burdens the defendant's right to remain silent.
Thus viewed, the real advantage of discovery is not to the prosecutor
but to the orderly processes of trial.
In Williams the Court further argued that the discovery order did
not interfere with the defendant's right to await the close of the prosecu-
tion's case before electing whether to rely on his affirmative defense or
to abandon it in light of developments at trial or among his witnesses.
By disclosing an alibi defense to the prosecution, the defendant does not
commit himself to using it. As long as the prosecution does not engage
in conduct such as promising the jury in opening argument that the
defendant will raise a particular affirmative defense, which should for
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this reason be considered improper argument,1 5 the defendant is still
free to defend or remain silent when his turn comes in the trial proce-
dure.
Certainly it is true that if prosecution discovery is permitted the
defendant might lose some incidental advantages from withholding his
affirmative defense until trial. For example, during the interim between
arrest and trial rebuttal evidence might otherwise become unavailable
or more difficult to discover or locate, or a prosecutor might not request
a continuance because of the inconvenience to jurors. However, protec-
tion of these kinds of advantages does not comport with any policy of
the privilege against self-incrimination.
That is the argument in favor of the constitutionality of prosecution
discovery. The critical element in this analysis clearly is its conclusion
that the procedure for advance disclosure of affirmative defenses does
not involve the defendant in providing evidence that is useful for the
prosecutor's case-in-chief.316 In Williams the Supreme Court did not
specifically argue that the evidence subject to discovery was not incrimi-
nating. Instead, it argued that there was no compulsion within the mean-
ing of the fifth amendment because only the same pressures that operate
on a defendant to present a defense at trial operate on him to provide
pretrial discovery. The validity of this argument is, however, a function
of whether the evidence disclosed carries incriminating information. If
it does, then the defendant is being compelled to help the prosecution
3
'In the course of its argument on this question, the Court in Willians said: "Nothing in
such a rule requires the defendant to rely on an alibi or prevents him from abandoning the defense;
these matters are left to his unfettered choice." 399 U.S. at 84-85. In a footnote the Court pointed
out that nothing occurred in the case before it to force the defendant into presenting an affirmative
defense. The Court said:
On these facts, then, we simply are not confronted with the question of whether a
defendant can be compelled in advance of trial to select a defense from which he can no
longer deviate. We do not mean to suggest, though, that such a procedure must necessar-
ily raise serious constitutional problems. See State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d
129, 137, 163 N.W.2d 177, 181 (1968) ("[i]f we are discussing the right of a defendant
to defer until the moment of his testifying the election between alternative and inconsist-
ent alibis, we have left the conception of the trial as a search for truth far behind").
Id. at 84-85 n.15. See also State v. Cocco, 73 Ohio App. 182, -. , 55 N.E.2d 430, 432 (1943).
The suggested result would ignore the circumstance that the government has no legitimate interest
in locking a defendant into a defense before trial. Its interest in expediting the judicial process may
justify advance disclosure of contemplated affirmative defenses so that the prosecutor may be
prepared to meet them, if he can, at trial-without the necessity of a continuance. That interest is
served without depriving the defendant of flexibility of response to developments.
318See Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr.
129, 133 (1970).
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prepare its case-in-chief-something the defendant does not do by pres-
enting a defense. In this way the defendant may even be required to give
the prosecution evidence essential to establish a case strong enough to
survive a motion for judgment of acquittal or a directed verdict, or
strong enough to put pressure on the defendant to present a defense that
he might otherwise have decided was unnecessary. Thus, even analyzed
from the requirement of compulsion as discussed by the majority in
Williams, the crucial question in considering the constitutionality of
prosecution discovery is whether the demanded evidence could tend to
incriminate the defendant. If the disclosure compelled by the court's
discovery order carries damaging evidence, more than a procedural
adjustment is involved. The defendant would then' je the source of part
of the prosecution's case.
The Limitation to Evidence the Defendant Intends to Produce at
Trial. On this basis, the argument is defective. It is not difficult to
imagine circumstances in which the Williams and Jones discovery or-
ders might compel a defendant to divulge other than wholly exculpatory
evidence. An alibi witness, for example, might be able to confirm the
defendant's innocent whereabouts for most of the time surrounding the
occurrence of the crime. If, however, during the critical time frame there
is a lag during which the defendant and his witness were separated, the
witness might become a source of government evidence of the defen-
dant's availability to commit the crime, thus serving to support evidence
placing him at the scene. Such a circumstance would be consistent with
the innocence of the defendant. For example, if the defendant is charged
with a Monday-night murder in his neighborhood, he might have an
alibi defense with friends prepared to testify that they were watching a
televised football game with the defendant during the hours in which the
crime occurred. If the defendant, however, left the house on an errand
during half-time and, perhaps, even returned late for the second half,
he will know that the testimony of his alibi witnesses may damage him
as far as the period of time of his absence is concerned. He will decide
whether to risk the ambiguity of his defense depending upon the strength
of the case against him developed at trial. If his failure to disclose his
alibi and supporting witnesses to the prosecution before trial will fore-
close him from raising it at trial, to protect his option he may be
compelled to supply evidence that the prosecution itself could utilize. In
this circumstance the defendant may be forced either to incriminate
himself or to abandon his alibi defense for fear of harming himself by
disclosing it before he has had a chance to take the measure of the
evidence against him. This dilemma may be more cruel to the innocent
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accused, who will likely assume a weak prosecution case and more
readily decline to bolster it with evidence susceptible of incriminating
interpretation even if it means foregoing a defense. "The privilege serves
to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous
circumstances. 3 1 7
Although the discovery order in Jones necessitated a disclosure
only of medical evidence, it was also capable of compelling disclosure
of directly incriminating evidence. If the alleged impotency had been
psychological in origin, medical reports might have contained a discus-
sion of defendant's psychiatric history, possibly including aggressive
emotional disorders from which an inference of his predisposition to
violent crime might have been drawn. Jones likely did not present any
such possibility; the defendant in that case was apparently relying on
physical impotency caused by injuries he had suffered earlier, although
the implication of consequent psychological impediments was not pre-
cluded.
Direct incrimination is even a more likely consequence of a discov-
ery order that is broader than the affirmative-defense limitation, even
if it applies only to evidence that the defendant intends to produce on
his own behalf. In Grunewald v. United States 18 defendant had claimed
the fifth amendment before a grand jury and later at his trial answered
in a manner consistent with his innocence the same questions that the
grand jury had asked. In holding that it was improper for the prosecut-
ing attorney to try to impeach defendant with his prior claim that his
answers might tend to incriminate him, the Supreme Court observed:
Had he answered the questions put to him before the grand jury in the
same way he subsequently answered them at trial, this nevertheless
would have provided the Government with incriminating evidence
from his own mouth. For example, had he stated to the grand jury that
he knew Grunewald, the admission would have constituted a link be-
tween .him and a criminal conspiracy, and this would be true even
though he was entirely innocent and even though his friendship with
Grunewald was above reproach. 31
The following are examples of innocent disclosures that might es-
tablish factual elements of the prosecution's case: evidence that the
3
"Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956). See also Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957).
318353 U.S. 391 (1957).
Mid. at 421-22.
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defendant was acting under a mistake of fact; evidence that he was
acting in self-defense; evidence that he was merely a bystander; or evi-
dence that he lacked the required mens rea. Although defenses such as
mistake-of-fact and self-defense might be considered affirmative defen-
ses because the defendant has the burden of going forward with the
evidence, they do not meet the second element of an affirmative defense
as defined for present purposes because they will ordinarily depend on
facts occurring at the scene of the crime. For example, a witness who
can testify that the victim was threatening the defendant when he was
killed ordinarily will also be able to testify that the defendant committed
the homicide or at least that he was in a position to do so. If the identity
of this witness is disclosed to the prosecution before trial, he might
become the prosecution's sole eyewitness to the alleged homicide and
substantially strengthen a circumstantial case.320 The defendant might
also be compelled to bolster the prosecution's prima facie case if he is
required to disclose evidence he intends to use only as a last resort to
establish that he was responsible for only a lesser included offense.32
Arguably, the problems raised by these and other possibilities could
be obviated by a protective-order procedure. Even if prosecution discov-
ery orders were routinely granted, the defendant might be permitted
specially to plead the privilege against self-incrimination as a bar to
discovery from him if he asserts that unusual circumstances in his case
would result in compulsory disclosure of incriminating evidence."' The
defendant's invocation of the special plea would be subject to judicial
review when he later produced the evidence at trial. If he never did, the
government would have lost nothing in its trial preparation by not hav-
ing been apprised of the evidence.
The Limitation to Cases in which the Defendant Has Received
Discovery. The presence of defense discovery is a factor common to rule
16(c), Williams, and Jones. This factor takes a slightly different form
in each. Rule 16(c) expressly makes prosecutorial discovery a condition
of defense discovery and provides a broad discovery procedure that a
defendant may invoke. In Williams the Florida statute required a prose-
cuting attorney who had received alibi discovery from a defendant to
3°See Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 327, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr.
129, 133 (1970); GRISWOLD 9.3 2 Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 327, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129,
133 (1970).
322Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195, 208-09 (1946); see United
States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
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disclose to the defendant the names and addresses of his rebuttal wit-
nesses to the alibi defense..323 Florida also provides a defendant with
broad discovery independent of the alibi defense,324 and the Court noted
that defendant had utilized those discovery provisions.325 In a footnote
disclaiming any opinion on the constitutionality of notice-of-alibi rules
in states other than Florida, the Court said: "[T]hat conclusion must
await a specific context and an inquiry, for example, into whether the
defendant enjoys reciprocal discovery against the State. 3 6 Jones arose
in the context of California's .system of broad discovery. The California
Supreme Court did not specifically rely on this factor in reaching its
decision, but Chief Justice Traynor, in later discussing that decision,
argued that the defendant "can hardly demand pretrial discovery and
still insist on reserving his own surprises for the trial. 3 7
According to one possible evaluation of the relationship between
defense discovery and the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination, the defendant, as a condition of requesting and receiving
discovery, may be required to waive his right to assert the fifth amend-
ment privilege against prosecution discovery. This evaluation fits the
scheme of rule 16(c) better than it does the Williams and Jones cases.
Rule 16(c) provides prosecution discovery only upon the granting of a
defense discovery motion. Consequently, the defendant retains control
over whether the prosecution has access to his information. By contrast,
the initiative for discovery in Williams and Jones may be with the
prosecution; its right to discovery does not necessarily depend upon the
defendant's actually seeking discovery himself. In Williams the Court
discussed Florida's liberal discovery provisions and, also, the discovery
obligation of the prosecution as a condition of its-not defen-
dant's-receiving discovery. The Court did so in the context of its argu-
ment that the notice-of-alibi provision did not violate general due pro-
cess-not in its fifth amendment discussion. Nor did the court in Jones
rely on California's defense discovery law in rejecting the fifth amend-
ment challenge.
Even as applied to rule 16(c), the waiver reasoning cannot succeed.
31399 U.S. at 80.
2
'FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220.
31399 U.S. at 81 n.9.
111d. at 82 n. I1. In surveying other notice-of-alibi statutes, a California court observed that
only those of Florida and New Jersey explicitly provide for reciprocal discovery. Rodriguez v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 496-97, 88 Cal. Rptr. 154, 155-56 (1970).
"'Traynor 248.
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"There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may
not condition by the exaction of a price." ' 8 The fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination is such a right.32 9 Professor Pye likened
conditional discovery to telling a defendant, "Basically we have an un-
fair system here. If you want a fair system, then waive your privilege
against self-incrimination." 3 To the extent that the defendant's dis-
covery rights are of a constitutional character, conditional discovery
plays one constitutional right against another. For example, a defen-
dant's refusal to supply discovery would certainly not justify a prosecu-
tor's refusal to disclose material exculpatory evidence in his posses-
sion.3 31
If the fact of defense discovery is to have some meaning for the
legality of prosecution discovery, it must lie in a different perspective.
Chief Justice Traynor, explaining his opinion in Jones, said that a defen-
dant could fairly "be required to make his decision whether to remain
silent or to present his defense . . . before trial if he is given discovery
of the prosecution's case before trial. 13 32 In this context, defense dis-
covery serves as the basis of a reply to the argument-relied upon by
the dissenters in Williams 333 and Jones33 4-that the privilege against
self-incrimination not only protects the defendant from compulsion to
participate in the preparation of the case against himself, but also inde-
32
'Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); accord, United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570, 572, 582 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
1'United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614
(1965).
mPye, supra note 12, at 98. The American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Pretrial
Proceedings made the following arguments:
If disclosures to the accused promote finality, orderliness, and efficiency in
prosecutions generally, these gains should not depend upon the possibly capricious will-
ingness of the accused to make reciprocal disclosures. Indeed, there is considerable
doubt whether, in practice, the imposition of a condition will accomplish anything but
denial of disclosures to the accused. Certainly, the usual reasons for denying disclosures
to the accused-dangers of "perjury or intimidation of witnesses-are not alleviated by
forcing the defendant to make discovery, nor are they heightened by his failure to
disclose."
ABA ADVISORY CoNmi. 45, quoting United States v. Fratello, 44 F.R.D. 444,448 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"'See text accompanying note 89 supra.
1rTraynor 248-49. Chief Justice Traynor also argued: "He can hardly demand pretrial
discovery and still insist on reserving his own surprises for the trial. The good coin of discovery
gains in value when it is fairly exchanged at the appropriate procedural hours." Id. at 248.
m399 U.S. at 111-13 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
1358 Cal. 2d at 62-69, 372 P.2d at 922-27, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882-87 (Peters & Dooling, JJ.,
dissenting).
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pendently assures him a right to take no part in the criminal case, to
remain silent and impassive, until the prosecution has made out a legally
sufficient case against him. Thus, the purpose served by defense discov-
ery in the rationale for the constitutionality of prosecution discovery is
that it arguably provides the defendant with a preview of the prosecu-
tion's case sufficient to enable him to make his defense decisions in
advance of trial with, as nearly as possible, as much information to
guide him as he would have when the prosecution rests.
However, the discovery available under rule 16 and in Florida and
California is still inadequate to accomplish that end. Unless the defen-
dant may depose all of the adverse witnesses as well as inspect all of
the adverse physical evidence, he is at a considerable disadvantage in
evaluating the case he must meet before it is presented. Writing in
dissent in Williams, Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, argued
that even this might not be enough: "[R]egardless of the amount of
pretrial preparation, a case looks far different when it is actually being
tried than when it is only being thought about."335 The dissenting
justices reasoned that before trial the defendant does not know what the
strength of the prosecution case is-only what it might be.33, Their
argument is that "the pressures on defendants to plead an alibi created
by this procedure are not only quite different than the pressures operat-
ing at the trial itself, but are in fact significantly greater."337 At trial
the pressure comes only from the actual strength of the prosecution's
case; pretrial, the pressure comes from consideration of the strongest
possible case that the prosecution could present in order not to foreclose
the alibi option if the prosecutor should in fact have that good a case.
Broad defense discovery, including file disclosure and depositions,
would minimize the force of this argument. In addition, assuming that
no incriminating information is disclosed by prosecution discovery, it
remains to be explained what prejudice the defendant suffers or what
policy of the privilege against self-incrimination is violated if the defen-
dant is forced to divulge a non-incriminating defense that he may never
use.
Even if the presence of adequate defense discovery could balance
the loss of the defendant's otherwise unrestricted right not to do any-
thing until the prosecution has presented its case, it does not satisfy the
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objection that a discovery order against a defendant might force him to
disclose evidence rightly or wrongly susceptible of an incriminating in-
terpretation. This objection can be answered only by a mandate to
judges to deny discovery upon a claim of such danger. The availability
of reciprocal defense discovery may enhance the serviceability of this
protective-order procedure by funneling to the defendant information
useful to him in assessing the incriminatory character of his evidence
that is within the scope of a discovery motion and thus the need for him
to enter a special plea of the privilege in opposition to the motion.
Nevertheless, the protective-order procedure is not sufficient to shield
prosecution discovery from constitutional objection.
For two reasons prosecution discovery, even as thus restricted, is
incompatible with the privilege against self-incrimination. The first is
that it would encourage law enforcement officers to pursue otherwise
weak cases at least to the discovery stage and thereby subject the defen-
dant to a greater risk of prosecution and thus of conviction. 38
The protective-order procedure was designed in the course of the
foregoing discussion as a response to the argument that a particular
discovery order might elicit an incriminating response. But can it give
protection co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination?
The privilege protects against compelled disclosure not only of unequi-
vocally damaging or conclusively incriminating evidence but also of any
link in the chain of such evidence.
The Supreme Court has given wide berth to the category of incrimi-
nating information to guard against any invasion of the privileged do-
main and to avoid a natural impatience with the withholding of any
relevant information in a fact-finding proceeding. "The privilege af-
forded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a
conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link
in the chain of evidence" or clues to such evidence. 39 The defendant's
apprehension of danger from an answer must be reasonable, and the
danger of incrimination must be real and appreciable-not merely ima-
m'As Justice White, author of the Williams opinion, has written, the privilege against self-
incrimination "protects a witness from being compelled to furnish evidence that could result in his
being subjected to a criminal sanction . . . if, but only if, after the disclosure the witness will be
in greater danger of prosecution and conviction." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
100 (1964) (White & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
'Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). See also Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6, 16, 18 (1969); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48, 52 (1968); Emspak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1955); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950); Mason v.
United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
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ginary.30 If prosecution for an offense is barred by the statute of limita-
tions or by a grant of immunity, for example, information relating to
that offense would not be incriminating and its disclosure may be com-
pelled.34 The privilege also does not protect disclosures that would
subject the witness only to disgrace or loss of his job.32
A determination by a witness that a disclosure might tend to in-
criminate him does not conclusively establish its privileged status;
rather, a judge must pass on whether invocation of the privilege is
justified. 3 3 The judge may not require the witness to prove the hazard,
as that would compel him "to surrender the very protection which the
privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only
be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which
it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation
of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious
disclosure could result. ' 3  Consequently, the judge may not overrule
the claim of privilege unless he determines that it was "'perfectly clear,
from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that
the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have
such tendency' to incriminate. 345
While the "link-in-the-chain" analysis is appropriate for determin-
ing whether an ordinary witness may be required to serve as the source
of information, it is not adequate to protect a defendant. 36 Therefore,
"[flor the party defendant in a criminal case, the privilege has been
construed to permit him to refuse to answer any question whatever in
the cause. . .. ,,317 Accordingly, the defendant may not even be called
to the witness stand.341 In connection with prosecution discovery, sound
"'Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896).
31'Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
"'Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66
(1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896).
3 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S.
362, 365 (1917).
"'Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
3151d. at 488, quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881), which was cited with
approval in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 579-80 (1892) (emphasis in original).
"'A question which might appear at first sight a very innocent one might, by affording a link
in a chain of evidence, become the means of bringing home an offense to the party answering.'"
Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917), quoting The Queen v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep.
730 (K.B. 1861). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1964).
316See Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr.
129, 133 (1970).
3118 WIGMORE § 2268, at 406 (emphasis in original).
341d.
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reasons justify this special treatment for a defendant; in his access to
the privilege against self-incrimination, he should not have to hurdle
even the "link-in-the-chain" test of incrimination. The Supreme Court
has held that if an official inquiry is directed at a person in "a highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities," '49 the party
may not be put in the position of choosing which of the requests for
information he is privileged not to answer, considering all of the uncer-
tainties that are involved; he may refuse to respond to any of them.110
It is purely conjectural for any court to attempt to foresee all the results
and consequences that may follow from requiring discovery in any given
case.
The prosecutor may find comfort in the fruits of a discovery order
in his favor beyond what would be available to him if the defendant were
allowed to await the ordinary course of trial to present his case. This is
true whether the defendant complies by producing evidence, asserts that
hhe has no evidence to produce, or interposes a special plea in bar of the
motion. Justice Peters, in a characteristically vigorous dissent in Jones,
pointed out one source of such comfort: "[T]he compelled revelation by
the defendant that he may have only a weak defense may itself be self-
criminating. ' 31 In addition, the very invocation of a special plea by the
defendant may communicate to the prosecution a valuable insight into
the defendant's case. If the prosecution can thus learn either that the
defendant has a weak defense or that some evidence disclosed by the
defendant will likely help the prosecution's case, it will be more inclined
to initiate a doubtful prosecution or to pursue a weak case to trial. As
long as the prosecution can establish a prima facie case, it will learn in
advance whether it can depend on a boost, or at least no substantial
opposition, from the defendant at trial. That alone might make the
difference in its calculations of whether or not to abandon a prosecution.
In this way prosecutorial discovery serves the very "poking about"
function that the privilege against self-incrimination is designed to pre-
vent.
Recognizing this, the California Supreme Court has now backed
off from its experiment with discovery, though it has not backed away
3
'Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
0Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 18 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 96-
97 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44-54 (1968); Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 78-79 (1965). See also California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
3'Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 66, 372 P.2d 919, 925, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 885. See
also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 564, 585, 586 (1892).
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from Jones. In 1970 in Prudhomme v. Superior Court32 that court was
asked to sustain a discovery order that compelled defendant's attorney
"to disclose to the prosecution the names, addresses and expected testi-
mony of the witnesses [defendant] intends to call at trial."353 The court
recoiled at this extension of its narrow ruling in Jones beyond the
affirmative-defense limitation and beyond even the rule 16(c) restriction
to documentary and other physical evidence. It held the order invalid
because "it does not clearly appear from the face of the order or from
the record below that the information demanded from [defendant] can-
not possibly have a tendency to incriminate her."3 4
The second reason that the protective-order procedure is not ade-
quate to the anticipated mischief is the potential elasticity of such an
exception to an unpopular constitutional privilege. 55 This tendency to
expand is already apparent in the prosecution discovery area. The Jones
reasoning was expressed in terms of affirmative defenses; Williams dealt
with an affirmative defense, but its language was not confined to that
situation; and rule 16(c) applies to all defenses. The dissenters in
Williams"' and Jones37 foretold a broadening of the comparatively
narrow application of discovery in those cases.358
Moreover, neither Williams nor Jones even provided for the
3522 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970). See also Bradshaw v. Superior Court,
2 Cal. 3d 332, 466 P,2d 680, 85 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1970).




5 See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 70 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
316399 U.S. at 107-08, 114-16 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
758 Cal. 2d at 65-66, 372 P.2d at 924-25, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85 (Peters, J., dissenting).
3516 n State v. Grove, 65 Wash. 2d 525, 398 P.2d 170 (1965), the Washington Supreme Court
held that the privilege was not violated by a court order requiring defendant's attorney to deliver
to the prosecutor an apparently incriminating letter that was in the possession of the attorney and
had been written by defendant to his wife. Nothing in the court's opinion suggested that defendant
intended to use the letter in evidence. The letter had been sent by defendant from jail and had been
read by jail authorities pursuant to routine censorship procedures. The prosecution learned of the
existence of the letter when a friend of defendant's wife told an investigator that the wife had shown
her the letter. The court's opinion did not explain how the attorney obtained the letter. It is unlikely
that defendant delivered it to him since defendant gave up possession of the letter when he mailed
it through jail authorities. If the wife had supplied the attorney the letter, she may not have been
acting on behalf of defendant; he was charged with the murder of her mother.
The court made no effort to explain why the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply.
It merely quoted from Jones that "'absent the privilege against self-incrimination or other privi-
leges provided by law, the defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest in denying the
prosecution access to evidence that can throw light on issues in the case.'" Id. at 529, 398 P.2d at
173.
If the wife, not acting as her husband's agent, had given the letter to the attorney, the privilege
against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege probably would not apply. Nevertheless,
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protective-order procedure that this discussion has shown should be
crucial to their affirmative-defense discovery provisions and to any ex-
tension of them. Rule 16(e) provides for protective orders, apparently
for either the prosecution or the defense. It does not, however, specify
the grounds for a protective order running in favor of either party and
does not mention the fifth amendment; it makes a protective order
available only "[u]pon a sufficient showing" without specifying what
must be shown."' 9
The Limitation to Documentary or Other Physical
Evidence. Rule 16(c) provides another limitation in an attempt to ac-
comodate the fifth amendment; it limits prosecution discovery to docu-
mentary or other physical evidence. It does not provide, however, that
the discovery order must specifically identify the item of evidence to be
disclosed. Limiting discovery to evidence that the defendant intends to
produce at trial was designed to avoid requiring production of incrimi-
nating evidence on the assumption that if the defendant intends to use
the evidence it must be wholly favorable to him. The validity of this
assumption might be enhanced by the further limitation to documentary
or other physical evidence. Arguably, the full effect of such evidence
the court did not clarify the facts.
In State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964), the Washington
Supreme Court had served notice one year before Grove that it thought that it could compel the
attorney for a defendant to produce, with or without a request, "criminal evidence (such as a knife,
other weapons, stolen property, etc.), which in itself has little, if any, material value for the
purposes of aiding counsel in the preparation of his client's case." Id. at 833, 394 P.2d at 684. In
Sowers the court held that a subpoena duces tecum served on the attorney for a coroner's inquest
was improper because in addition to requiring disclosure of physical evidence, it was tantamount
to requiring the attorney to testify against his client.
See also Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) (Blackmun, J.); In re Ryder,
263 F. Supp. 360, 365-67 (E.D. Va.), aff d, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967); cf Grant v. United States,
227 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1912); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1963). If
evidence privileged in the possession of the defendant loses its privileged character when the
defendant turns it over to his attorney, a defendant will be reluctant to give and his attorney will
be reluctant to accept incriminating evidence; thus the defendant's ability to cooperate with his
attorney would be interfered with. McMullen v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. App. 3d 224, 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 733 (1970); Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HAST. L.J. 865, 905-06 (1968).
'FED. R. CRINI. P. 16(e) provides in full as follows:
Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that the discovery or
inspection be denied, restricted or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate.
Upon motion by the government the court may permit the government to make such
showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the
court in camera. If the court enters an order geanting relief following a showing in
camera, the entire text of the government's statement shall be sealed and preserved in
the records of thc. court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an
appeal by the defendant.
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may be analyzed before the defendant decides whether to introduce it.
By contrast, defense disclosure of the name of a witness might risk the
vagaries of providing the government with subjective information that
may be potentially incriminating.
There is authority for a position that documentary or other physi-
cal evidence, at least in some circumstances, 30 should be discoverable
from a defendant notwithstanding the fifth amendment. Unlike testi-
mony, such evidence is subject to seizure by the government without the
consent of the accused by means of a reasonable search. A discovery
order for documentary or physical evidence could serve the same func-
tion as a search warrant, as long as it is subject to the same limitations.
In the course of Bentham's classic criticism of the privilege against self-
incrimination, he saw irony in its application to prevent a request for
physical evidence:
You know of such or such a paper; tell us where it may be found. A
request thus simple, your tenderness shudders at the thoughts of put-
ting to a man: his answer might lead to the execution of that justice,
which you are looking out for pretences to defeat. This request, you
abhor the thoughts of putting to him: but what you scruple not to do
(and why should you scruple to do it?) is, to dispatch your emissaries
in the dead of night to his house, to that house which you call his castle,
to break it open, and seize the documents by force.36'
Special rules for books and records already do exist in fifth amend-
ment law.362 An officer or agent of a corporation or other organization
to which the privilege does not apply may be compelled to deliver books
and records of the corporation in his possession, even if they would tend
to incriminate him personally,"3 but cannot be compelled to testify
orally about the location or subject matter of those books and re-
cords.364 The fifth amendment may not successfully be interposed
"'The Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment does apply to documentary or
physical evidence in general. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 629, 633-35 (1886).
115 BENTHAI, supra note 203, at 232.
3'Meltzer has written that "[w]here documentary evidence is involved, the inroads on the
privilege have been so sweeping as to challenge the basis of the general rule of protection." Meltzer,
supra note 271, at 688; see id. at 699-700. Judge Friendly has argued that the fifth amendment
should not apply to production of documents. Friendly, supra note 293, at 682-83, 701-03.
31See cases cited note 21 supra. Even though the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply to a corporation, the limitations of the fourth amendment do. Okla-
homa Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205-06 (1946); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
3
"United States v. Korder, 397 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1970); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118,
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against an order to produce "records required by law to be kept in order
that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the
appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of
restrictions validly established," whether kept by private individuals or
organizations.3 5 This rule does not apply to oral testimony regarding
the same matters.3 16 The custodian of public or governmental records
similarly may not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in defi-
ance of an order to produce those records.367 A bankrupt may be re-
quired to turn over to a trustee in bankruptcy incriminating books of
account .3  He may not, however, be compelled to testify about his
assets.3 19
The nature of the books and records excepted from the privilege
against self-incrimination may suggest that the distinction is between
business privacy and personal privacy.3Y° If personal documentary or
other physical evidence is to be subject to prosecution discovery, it must
be because it is non-testimonial evidence in the same sense as is appear-
ing in a lineup for identification, submitting to a blood test, or yielding
handwriting or voice specimens for identification comparisons.37, Testi-
monial character has been attributed to the surrender of requested docu-
128 (1957); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-86 (1911).
"Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911); see Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S.
1, 17, 33 (1948).
"The same reasoning applies to statutes requiring articles to be retained in custody, which
may turn out to be evidence of a crime, e.g., the hide of cattle killed, a brand on the hide being
possibly evidence that the animal killed was stolen by the killer." 8 WIGMORE § 2259c, at 367.
36Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 27 (1948). But see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424
(1971).
37Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 54, 56 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
'"Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1913); In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279-80
(1911); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34,41 (1924); Exparte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1923).
3'McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924).
30Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 70 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Meltzer, supra
note 271, at 715. In United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944), the Supreme Court said:
"The framers of the constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-disclosure, who were inter-
ested primarily in protecting individual civil liberties, cannot be said to have intended the privilege
to be available to protect economic or other interests of such organizations so as to nullify appro-
priate governmental regulations."
In writing against application of the fifth amendment to books and records, Judge Friendly
said: "The writings typically sought to be produced are not the outpourings of an individual's soul,
for which first amendment protection against subpoena may be in order, but rather the books and
records of an enterprise that is criminal .... " Friendly 703. This language suggests that a
distinction between business privacy and personal privacy in application of the fifth amendment
to physical evidence could be accomodated with his views.
"'Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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mentary or physical evidence on the theory that the defendant is con-
structively testifying at least that these tangible objects are in fact those
described in the request. On this basis compelled production of tangi-
ble evidence may be distinguished from a search and seizure that does
not call for the cooperation of the accused. Yet, the distinction may be
dissipated if in fact the government establishes a foundation for the
evidence independent of assistance provided by the defendant in its
production.373
From a fifth amendment perspective, the discovery of documents
is not free of the incriminatory impact of the encouragement to prosecu-
tion by disclosure of the weakness of the defense or, by a special plea,
of the potentially incriminating nature of some of the defense evidence.
Writings and records could also be ambiguous. 374 The dangers of prose-
cution discovery are aggravated in a case in which the beliefs or ideas
of the defendant may be involved, particularly when the subjects of
discovery are the "books, papers, [and] documents" included in rule
16(c). If the defendant were summoned before a police officer or a grand
jury and compelled to submit all documentary and other physical evi-
dence that demonstrated his innocence of criminal activity suspected of
him, surely such a broad invasion of his private enclave would readily
be recognized as a violation by his government of its relations with one
of its citizens. Is the situation materially different if before the request
is made the defendant is charged with a crime and put to his defense?
Or even if before the request is made the defendant is also given full
discovery of the prosecution's files and witnesses? The invitation that
this raises to a general search by a prosecutor instituting criminal
charges to test the defense by discovery does not comport with the
fundamental policies of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The fifth amendment is complemented in this area by the fourth
amendment. These two provisions of the Bill of Rights protect often
overlapping zones of privacy. 7 5 A discovery order for documentary or
other physical evidence must satisfy the fourth as well as the fifth
amendment.376 The contribution of the fourth amendment for present
3228 WIGMORE § 2264, at 380.
'
3 Friendly 702; Meltzer 700.
311ln United States v. Fratello, 44 F.R.D. 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the government, in
moving for discovery under Federal Rule 16(c), alleged that it needed the documents sought as
part of its prima facie case.
w'Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
"'Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195, 202, 205, 208-09 (1945);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629, 631-32, 633 (1886); Meltzer 701. See also Marchetti v.
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purposes, in addition to the requirement that the government establish
probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a crime and
does have in his possession evidence relating to that crime, is the re-
quirement that the order specifically describe the things to be seized.377
As a safeguard against the general search condemned by the fourth and
fifth amendments, this requirement must be considered essential if a
discovery order for tangible objects is to survive constitutional scrutiny.
The fourth amendment thus requires the prosecution to learn
through its own sources of the defendant's possession of the evidence
to be seized. Rule 16(c) can pass this fourth amendment test only if its
limitation to material documentary or other physical evidence "which
the defendant intends to produce at the trial and which are within his
possession, custody or control" is a sufficiently specific description of
the evidence to be produced. That language from the rule may often be
parroted by the prosecution in seeking an order under it; the rule does
not seem to contemplate that the court need individually identify each
item within the order. Certainly an order so worded could not meet the
specificity requirement for a search warrant. An officer executing a
search warrant or a judge scrutinizing the breadth of the search would
be ill equipped to ascertain whether particular documents meet the
description in the order. When the defendant or his attorney-not a law
enforcement officer-is to conduct the search, the language of the stat-
ute may be sufficiently specific to apprise him of what evidence is within
the reach of the order. It is not, however, sufficiently specific to preclude
a general search. It admits of a search for, or discovery of, evidence that
the government has no probable cause to believe exists. Under fourth
amendment analysis, it would seem to be immaterial that the evidence
sought is presumably non-incriminating.3 8 The essence of the fourth
amendment is a protection of privacy, regardless of whether or not an
invasion of it would yield damaging evidence.
CONCLUSION
As Justice White, author of the Williams opinion, wrote on an
United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968).
aOklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1945); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
"
8One reason often cited for the privilege against self-incrimination is that it recognizes "the
practical limits of governmental power; truthful self-incriminating answers cannot be compelled,
so why try." 8 WIGMORE § 2251, at 311; accord, Meltzer 701. If the discovery order applies only
to documentary or other physical evidence the defendant intends to produce at trial, it may be more




The State has the obligation to present the evidence. Defense counsel
need present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not
furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of his
client, or furnish any other information to help the prosecution's
case. . . .Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel
to put the State to its proof...."I
It can be only speculative for a court to conclude that disclosure
of evidence that it has not seen may be compelled from a defendant
without risking violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. This
is true even if the evidence belongs to a category in which directly
incriminating information is unlikely to repose. At the same time denial
of discovery will not cripple or seriously cramp the prosecutorial func-
tion. In realistic perspective the prosecution still does have a powerful
arsenal of discovery;"'0 it is being deprived of only one tool, and that
in the interest of insuring protection of fundamental rights valuable to
all citizens. "The Framers were well aware of the awesome investigative
and prosecutorial powers of government and it was in order to limit
those powers that they spelled out in detail in the Constitution the
procedure to be followed in criminal trials. '38'
Vigilance must be broader than the actual threats of abuse and
nearly as broad as their possible scope. Because circumstances in which
the application of the privilege against self-incrimination seems extrava-
gant are therefore easy to find, the privilege is a common focus of
majoritarian frustration. For this reason the important work of the
privilege needs the sanctity of a fundamental charter and a strong tradi-
tion of liberal interpretation. Being too often unpopular, it cannot
3'United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (dissenting & concurring opinion).
'"The former United States Attorney for the Southern District of California while in office
wrote that the prosecution can ordinarily anticipate affirmative defenses and does not need discov-
ery of them. Miller, supra note 53, at 317-20.
-'\Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111-12 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black
continued:
All of these rights are designed to shield the defendant against state power. None are
designed to make convictions easier and taken together they clearly indicate that in our
system the entire burden of proving criminal activity rests on the State. The defendant,
under our Constitution, need not do anything at all to defend himself, and certainly he
cannot be required to help convict himself. Rather he has an absolute, unqualified right
to compel the State to investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own
facts, and convince the jury through its own resources.
Id. at 112.
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with-stand niggardly enforcement or cautious interpretation based on
academically narrow distinctions. Otherwise, the fate of this important
privilege would be in the hands of every judge before whom it appeared
or at the mercy of every epoch of ideological crisis ever to divide our
citizenry.
The fifth amendment helps ensure a compatibility of government
and individual freedom. Respect for that balance discourages sniper
attacks picking off the privilege a forward piece at a time as well as
direct frontal assaults upon it.382
ln Brooks v. Tennessee, 92 S. Ct. 1891 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a rule requiring
that a criminal defendant testify first for the defense or not at all violated the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court said:
Although a defendant will usually have some idea of the strength of his evidence,
he cannot be absolutely certain that his witnesses will testify as expected or that they
will be effective on the stand. They may collapse under skillful and persistent cross-
examination, and through no fault of their own they may fail to impress the jury as
honest and reliable witnesses. In addition, a defendant is sometimes compelled to call a
hostile prosecution witness as his own. Unless the State provides for discovery deposi-
tions of prosecution witnesses, which Tennessee apparently does not, the defendant is
unlikely to know whether this testimony will prove entirely favorable.
Because of these uncertainties, a defendant may not know at the close of the State's
case whether his own testimony will be necessary or even helpful to his cause. Rather
than risk the dangers of taking the stand, he might prefer to remain silent at that point,
putting off his testimony until its value can be realistically assessed. Yet, under the
Tennessee rule, he cannot make that choice "in the unfettered exercise of his own will."
Section 40-2403 exacts a price for his silence by keeping him off the stand entirely unless
he chooses to testify first. This, we think, casts a heavy burden on a defendant's other-
wise unconditional right not to take the stand. The rule, in other words, "cuts down on
the privilege [to remain silent] by making its assertion costly."
Id. at 1893-94, quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
Brooks is similar to Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), in that it arguably involves only
a procedural adjustment in the timing of the defendant's disclosure of his evidence. The uncertainty
confronting the defendant in Brooks at the time he was required to take the stand was even more
aggravated in Williams because he not only has not had a chance to see his own case unfold, but
also is even more uncertain about the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's case. Thus
doubt is cast on the continuing validity of Williams.
Arguably, Brooks may be distinguished from Williams on three grounds. First, Brooks was
not limited to disclosure of affirmative defenses. This factor seems insignificant, however, since
the defendant was not required to make disclosure until the prosecution has presented its case-in-
chief and so could not capitalize on defendant's testimony for his own case. Secondly, Brooks
involved a requirement that the defendant divulge his own testimony. The Florida statute involved
in Williams specifically provided that the defendant could not be precluded from testifying himself
even if he did not comply with the alibi disclosure rule. 399 U.S. at 104. Even so, the penalty in
Williams of precluding the defendant from presenting any evidence other than his own testimony
certainly exacts a price for the defendant's silence. The final distinction between the two cases is
that in Brooks the defendant was actually prevented from testifying by operation of the challenged
rule. In Williams, on the other hand, the question of penalty did not arise because the defendant
did comply with the disclosure requirements. This fortuitous circumstance, not necessarily charac-
teristic of other cases presenting either the Brooks or the Williams problem, cannot be considered
an important factor. The compulsion was successful in Williams, and that is sufficient to constitute
a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
